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Abstract
Two types of intrinsically motivated workers are considered: “good” workers
care about the mission of an organization, whereas “bad” workers derive plea-
sure from destructive behavior. Compared to the case with only good motivated
workers, the mission-oriented sector has to resort to higher monitoring to deter
bad workers from entering the sector. In equilibrium, bad workers work in the
for-profit sector where they behave like “normal”people, while good workers self
select into the mission-oriented sector. In the profit-oriented sector, both mon-
itoring and bonus payments for good behavior increase to control the damage
caused by bad workers. The results of the paper are illustrated by examples
from child care and the threat posed by pedophiles in this sector.
Keywords: intrinsic motivation, incentive contract, non-profit, sabotage,
candidate selection.
1. Introduction
Intrinsic motivation is generally treated by economists as something beneficial
to organizations. Most theoretical models on the subject suppose that intrinsic
IWe are indebted to Roland Be´nabou, Maitreesh Ghatak, Guido Friebel, Martin Hellwig,
Paul Seabright, and Konrad Stahl for helpful discussions. Furthermore, we thank Christoph
Engel, Matthias Lang, Baptiste Massenot, Sarah Sandford and Philipp Weinschenk for their
comments, as well as seminar participants at Mannheim, Rotterdam, Bonn, Frankfurt, Ox-
ford, Paris, Hannover and Lugano. Finally we are indebted to two anonymous referees who
contributed greatly by their suggestions to improve the paper content and organization. All
remaining errors are ours. Emmanuelle Auriol would also like to thank the French Develop-
ment Agency (AFD) for its financial support. Stefanie Brilon would like to thank the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft, the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods and the
Swiss National Science Foundation (Sinergia grant 130648 and 147668) for their financial
support.
∗Corresponding author
Email addresses: emmanuelle.auriol@tse-fr.eu (Emmanuelle Auriol),
brilon@econ.uni-frankfurt.de (Stefanie Brilon)
Preprint submitted to Elsevier May 6, 2014
motivation arises if workers derive a benefit from doing good - what is often
referred to as warm glow utility - or when workers are interested in a certain goal
or mission, like for example helping the poor or protecting the environment. An
organization that is dedicated to such a mission may find it easier and cheaper
to attract workers pursuing similar goals. However, other aspects of a job may
also instil intrinsic motivation in certain types of workers. And these other
aspects are not necessarily beneficial for the employer. This is illustrated by the
United Nations sex-for-food scandal, which was exposed by“Save the Children”,
an UK-based nonprofit organization: it showed that in 2006 aid workers were
systematically abusing minors in a refugee camp in Liberia, selling food for sex
with girls as young as 8.1 Helping refugees is the kind of mission-oriented work
that is likely to attract workers interested in this mission – what we will refer to
as good motivated workers. But such a job also involves working with vulnerable
children in a remote location with little control from the outside which may also
attract workers with quite different intentions – what we will call bad workers.
Examples for socially destructive behavior such as this abound, ranging from
different forms of sexual misconduct, over terrorism to pyromania and other
kinds of abuse.2 In this paper, we analyze how different sources of intrinsic
motivation of workers may affect labor management and production outcomes
both in for-profit and nonprofit organizations.
Psychologists have long recognized and studied anti-social behavior. One strand
of the literature, as well as most traditional psychiatry, focuses on so-called inter-
nal determinants. Anti-social behaviors, perceived as a pathology, are explained
by individual predispositions such as genetics, personality traits, or pathological
risk factors rooted in childhood. Another strand of the literature focuses on ex-
ternal determinants. It aims to explain how“ordinary”people can be induced to
behave in evil ways by situational variables (see Zimbardo, 2004).3 Our paper
is consistent with both views. We assume that the level of negative intrinsic
motivation of bad workers is exogenous. That is, anti-social behavior is ulti-
mately driven by internal determinants. However, it depends on the incentives
given by an organization whether bad workers will indeed act in an anti-social
way or whether they will behave in the organization’s interest. In other words,
whether individuals act upon their predisposition for certain behaviors depends
on external determinants (i.e., on situational variables). If the punishment they
face and/or the reward for good behavior are high enough, most people will not
act destructively.
We extend the model by Besley and Ghatak (2005) who consider only good and
1See the report by Save the Children UK (2006). Similar cases have since been reported
from Southern Sudan, Burundi, Ivory Coast, East Timor, Congo, Cambodia, Bosnia and Haiti
(see “The U.N. sex-for-food scandal”, Washington Times, Tuesday, May 9, 2006 and the report
by Save the Children UK, 2008).
2For a more detailed discussion, see the following section.
3For instance, in a famous experiment on obedience to authority, Milgram (1974) has
shown that two thirds of the subjects were willing to inflict lethal electrical shocks upon total
strangers.
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regular workers, whereas there are three types of workers in our model: good,
regular, and bad. Regular workers only care about monetary incentives, good
workers care about money and the mission of the organization, and bad work-
ers care about money and whether they can do things they like, but which are
harmful to the organization. We further generalize the approach by Besley and
Ghatak (2005) by adding monitoring as an additional choice variable of the em-
ployer in order to deal with the different incentive issues raised by the presence
of different kinds of workers. In contrast to standard incentive theory, where
monitoring is treated as a black box (i.e., fixed cost), here the level of monitor-
ing is endogenous and central to the design and management of organizations:
while monitoring reinforces the effort incentives of good and regular workers,
it makes bad actions or anti-social behavior less attractive as it increases the
chances of getting caught and being punished. By disentangling these two roles
of supervision, the paper therefore adds a new explanation why, in practice, so
many resources are spent on monitoring.
We consider two sectors of the economy, one profit-oriented and one mission-
oriented. As in Besley and Ghatak (2005), we assume that in the nonprofit
sector, organizations are structured around some mission, for example provid-
ing public services, or catering to the needs of disadvantaged groups of society.4
These organizations may attract workers who care about this specific mission
and derive an intrinsic benefit from their work. Given this setup, we first con-
sider the case with only good and regular workers and find the classic result by
Besley and Ghatak (2005) that the mission-oriented sector offers lower wages
and makes less use of bonus payments than the profit-oriented sector. We also
show that the mission-oriented sector monitors less than the profit-oriented sec-
tor, which is not an explicit result in Besley and Ghatak (2005) as there is no
monitoring.
We then introduce bad workers who derive utility from behaving in an anti-social
way. We take the equilibrium contracts from Besley and Ghatak (2005) as a
starting point for our analysis. That is, we use the equilibrium contracts with
only good and regular workers, and costly monitoring, as a benchmark against
which we compare our results. Since profit-oriented organizations monitor more
in equilibrium, they are a priori less vulnerable to anti-social behavior. Bad
workers may behave like regular workers in the profit-oriented sector and thus
be totally undistinguishable from normal people. By contrast, if bad workers
join the mission-oriented sector, then it is only to take advantage of the low level
of monitoring and to behave badly. The more organizations in this sector rely on
the intrinsic motivation of good workers and the less they make use of monetary
4We use the terms mission-oriented and nonprofit organization equivalently since we be-
lieve them to be largely congruent in reality. However, there are cases where organizations
do not have the legal status of a nonprofit, but still follow a mission. This has recently been
highlighted by the literature on corporate social responsibility as discussed, for instance, in
Be´nabou and Tirole (2010). For a further discussion of mission- vs. profit-oriented organiza-
tions, see also Besley and Ghatak (2005).
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incentives and control, the more likely they are to become the target of bad
workers. This first result helps to explain why, for instance, most scandals of
child abuse involve organizations with no or little monitoring in the past, such
as some religious institutions or refugee camps (see the discussion in Sections 2
and 5).
We then analyze how contracts in both sectors have to change relative to the
situation when there are only regular and good workers if organizations have to
deal with bad workers. We consider two possible scenarios: If the damage caused
by anti-social behavior is expected to be sufficiently high, then both sectors will
want to deter such behavior completely (full deterrence equilibrium), whereas a
certain amount of destructive behavior may be tolerated in equilibrium if the
expected damage is low (partial deterrence equilibrium). We show that in an
equilibrium with full deterrence, bad workers join the for-profit sector where
they are indistinguishable from regular workers, while good workers self-select
into the mission-oriented sector. To incentivize the bad workers to behave well,
monitoring and bonus payments for good behavior both have to increase in the
for-profit sector, combining “the carrot and the stick”. In the nonprofit sector,
on the other hand, the focus is on the stick to discourage bad workers from
joining and thus prevent the occurrence of bad behavior: monitoring has to go
up, while the incentives for good behavior tend to stay the same to avoid loosing
the benefit from the self-selection of good workers.
Next, we discuss the robustness of our model with respect to variations in the
damage caused by bad workers. If the expected damage is relatively low, full
deterrence may not be worthwhile. We show that in an equilibrium where there
is partial deterrence in the for-profit sector, the mission-oriented sector will
generally opt for full deterrence such that all bad workers will again be found in
the profit-oriented sector. The only exception occurs when the potential damage
by bad workers is sufficiently low and good workers are very motivated such that
they do not need any monitoring: In that case the mission-oriented sector may
have no interest in introducing costly monitoring just to prevent a relatively
low level of sabotage, even though it will thus attract all bad workers. Finally,
deterrence, which is costly as it implies higher monitoring, even may become
entirely ineffective for workers with very high levels of bad motivation (e.g.,
extremists, kamikaze). We therefore also discuss ex ante measures of candidate
selection, which may help to reduce the occurrence of anti-social behavior by
screening out bad workers.
The paper is organized as follows: We first discuss in Section 2 the related
literature and some examples that illustrate our model, before we turn to the
description of our basic setup with only good and regular workers in Section 3.
We then introduce bad workers in Section 4 and show how the optimal contracts
have to change. The empirical implications of the theory are discussed in Section
5 in the context of child care services where the threat posed by pedophiles has
been widely documented. Section 6 concludes.
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2. Examples and Related Literature
There are many examples that illustrate the relevance of anti-social behavior
both in mission- and in profit-oriented organizations. Among them, the recent
abuse scandals in the Catholic Church stand out both by their shock potential
as well as by sheer numbers.
As of April 10, 2012, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops has counted
6,115 clerics “not implausibly”and“credibly”accused of sexually abusing 16,324
minors during the period 1950-2011. The John Jay report (see Terry, 2008)
found that“the problem was indeed widespread and affected more than 95 percent
of the dioceses”. Similar widespread problems of child abuse occurred in Ireland,
as documented in the report by the Commission of Inquiry into Child Abuse (see
CICA, 2009), and Germany (see Dt. Jugendinstitut, DJI, 2011, on abuse cases
in institutions). While the problem is not limited to church organizations it is,
however, particularly likely to occur under specific circumstances: A pedophile
will preferably target vulnerable children, such as refugees5 or orphans, simply
because they are less likely to expose him. Cases of physical, sexual or emotional
abuse of children in orphanages have been uncovered for instance, at Mount
Cashel Orphanage in Canada in the 1980s, or the Haut de la Garenne Children’s
home on the channel island of Jersey. Furthermore, foster homes, boarding
schools and detention centers seem to be at risk, as documented by the CICA
(2009) report and recent cases from Germany and France.6
Other examples for anti-social behavior resulting from some form of intrinsic mo-
tivation are pyromania, serial killing or sadism. Stambaugh and Styron (2003)
show that pyromaniacs may best be able to satisfy their urge for fire by working
for the firefighters and provide evidence, mostly from the United States, that
shows how serious the problem is.7 Along similar lines, the so-called “angels
of death” are psychopaths who manage to work in health care facilities, prefer-
ably with vulnerable patients (elderly, children, etc), to feed their need to kill.8
Finally a sadist might try to work in prisons or detention centers, that are pro-
tected by national security secrecy or by their geographical remoteness, to feed
his/her need to humiliate and harm others.9
Gibelman and Gelman (2004) list further evidence of destructive behavior in
mission-oriented organizations which include cases of questionable fund raising
practices, mismanagement, embezzlement, theft, money laundering, “personal
5See Save the Children UK (2006) and Save the Children UK (2008).
6See for instance www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2011/09/15/
01016-20110915ARTFIG00583-nouvelle-plainte-contre-le-pere-d-accueil-de-laetitia.php.
7Similar cases have been documented elsewhere, see for example www.lexpress.fr/
actualite/societe/pompier-pyromane-2-ans-de-prison 459032.html, or www.swiss-firefighters.
ch/News-file-article-sid-3427.html.
8See http://www.crimelibrary.com/notorious murders/angels/index.html.
9As examples, see the Stanford experiment on prison (see www.prisonexp.org/) and the
Abu Ghraib torture scandal (see for instance www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,
1025139,00.html).
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lifestyle enhancement” and kickbacks, corruption, as well as sexual misconduct.
Note, however, that anti-social behavior is not the monopoly of non-profit orga-
nizations, but is also found in for-profits. For instance, a terrorist might want to
work in an airport to have a privileged access to planes. Or a spy would be in-
terested in jobs in firms where he is likely to get access to sensitive information,
while his risk of being discovered is low.
By considering such destructive behavior and introducing bad workers, we con-
tribute to the literature on intrinsic motivation and its effects on agents’ behavior
which has received increasing attention in recent years, as documented, for ex-
ample, by the papers by Kreps (1997), Be´nabou and Tirole (2003), Frey (1997),
Murdock (2002) and Akerlof and Kranton (2005).10
Furthermore, our model is linked to the growing strand of literature on public
service motivation11 and its implications for hiring and remuneration schemes,
as for example Francois (2000), Francois (2003), Prendergast (2007) and Delf-
gaauw and Dur (2008). As in this literature, our workers show some form of in-
trinsic motivation when working in a certain sector or for a particular mission.12
For instance, Prendergast (2007) shows that intrinsically motivated agents in
the public sector should be biased either against or in favor of their clients,
depending on circumstances.13 While the focus of this paper is quite different
from ours, Prendergast (2007) also finds that sometimes the wrong people will
be drawn to a certain job.
Our model is closely related to the paper by Besley and Ghatak (2005) who
show that matching the mission preferences of principals and agents can en-
hance organizational efficiency and reduces the need for high-powered incen-
tives.14 There are hence many sectors where wages are not paid conditional
on performance, as for instance the civil service sector or many nonprofit or-
ganizations.15 Depending on circumstances, other factors may also play a role:
Nonprofits sometimes are even legally forbidden to pay incentive wages; see, for
instance, the discussion in Glaeser (2002). Or, as for example in the judicial
sector, there are institutional reasons for low-powered incentives: by minimizing
10Recently, destructive behavior has also become the subject of experimental economics.
See, for instance, Abbink and Herrmann (2009) and Abbink and Sadrieh (2009).
11See Dixit (2002) for a review on incentives in the public sector.
12Note, however, that from a technical point of view some of these models are quite different
from ours. In Francois (2000), for instance, all workers care for overall output and have no
particular preference for the public sector. Differences between the two sectors only come into
play through differences in property rights.
13That this may indeed be the case has been shown by Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1996)
in an empirical study on training programs. Bureaucrats tended to select applicants with
lower expected earnings into a training program, even though this negatively affected their
own payoff.
14Agents may also care about other aspects of their work environment. This has, for in-
stance, been analyzed by Kosfeld and Siemens (2011) who show that workers may self-select
across firms according to their preferences regarding team work.
15See also Borzaga and Tortia (2006), Ballou and Weisbrod (2003) and Serra et al. (2011) for
empirical studies on the incentives in for-profit and different forms of nonprofit organizations.
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economic incentives, the quality and independence of judgement increases (Pos-
ner, 1993). Finally, performance may just be too difficult or too expensive to
assess. This is the case of development aid, where the costs of monitoring in the
field are often prohibitively high. This lack of monitoring may lead to shirking
and absenteeism as has been analyzed for example by Chaudhury et al. (2006)
and Banerjee and Duflo (2006). However workers may not only just work less.
They may also behave in a way that damages the organization for which they
work or which is outright criminal. To prevent such destructive behavior, non-
profits therefore may want to engage in a more sophisticated selection process of
candidates. The difficulties of such a process have, for instance, been discussed
in Goldman (1982) and Greenberg and Haley (1986) for the selection of judges.
We will come back to this problem and to the above mentioned examples in
Section 5 of our paper.
3. Basic Setup
The model is based on Besley and Ghatak (2005). There are two sectors i =
F,N , where F indicates for-profit or profit-oriented and N indicates nonprofit
or mission-oriented organizations. Furthermore, there are three types of agents
j = g, r, b, where g stands for good, r for regular and b for bad workers, with
shares xr+xg+xb = 1 in the population. The last category is new compared to
Besley and Ghatak (2005) where there are only good and regular workers. The
type of an individual worker is not directly observable, but the distribution of
types is common knowledge.
Assumption 1. xb < xg < xr.
It is natural to assume that the share of bad workers is smaller than the share of
good workers, which is itself smaller than the share of regular workers (i.e., anti-
social personalities are fairly rare). Beside its intuitive appeal, this assumption
plays a technical role in Section 4.3, when we consider the possibility of bad
actions occurring in equilibrium.16
Each agent produces a basic output q and, depending on his effort e ∈ [0, 1], an
additional output ∆q with probability e. His effort cost is c(e) = ae2/2 where a
is a constant. In order to induce agent j to work harder, the principal in sector
i can offer him a contract consisting of a basic wage wij plus a bonus payment
tij ≥ 0 if a high output is observed. However, the principal only observes the
agent’s output with probability mi, where mi is the monitoring level in sector i.
This feature is new compared to Besley and Ghatak (2005).17 Introducing costly
16Assumption 1 is a sufficient condition to get an interior solution in bonus optimization in
Case III in Proposition C.3 in the online appendix. It plays a role only in this proof.
17In Besley and Ghatak (2005) monitoring is implicitly assumed to be costless (i.e., the
principals observe output at 0 cost).
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monitoring is a realistic extension of their model once we introduce bad workers
in the next section. Organizations need monitoring as another instrument to
differentiate between good and bad motivated types.
The cost of monitoring is M(mi), with M
′ > 0 and M ′′ ≥ 0. We assume that
mi ∈ {0, [m, 1]}, i.e., the principal can choose not to monitor or else he has to
choose at least a minimum level of monitoring m > 0. The idea is that there is
some fixed cost to monitoring. For example, the principal may have to hire at
least one employee for the task. As will become clear later on, in most cases the
principal will want to set the monitoring level positive but as low as possible,
which here is normalized at the minimum monitoring level m. This result is
similar to Becker (1968).18
We assume that there is a limited liability constraint such that the agent has to
receive at least a monetary payoff of 0. Furthermore, the agent’s outside utility
is assumed to be u¯ ≥ 0.19
Regular agents react only to extrinsic incentives (i.e., they work for money).
Good agents derive an intrinsic benefit θg > 0 from working successfully in the
nonprofit sector N . In sector F , neither type of agent r or g derives a positive
intrinsic benefit. Finally bad workers derive an intrinsic benefit θb > 0 from
pursuing a destructive action, which may cause a damage to any organization
F or N employing them.
As a benchmark case, we first concentrate on the case with only good and regular
workers, modeled in Besley and Ghatak (2005). The utility of agent j = r, g in
sector i = F,N can be described by
uij = wij + (mitij + θij)eij − ae2ij/2 , (1)
from which follows immediately that the agent will choose his optimal effort level
as eij = min
{
(mitij + θij)/a, 1
}
. To rule out corner solutions in the following
we assume that a is sufficiently large:
Assumption 2. a > ∆q +max{θg, θb}.
Under Assumption 2, we get an interior solution in effort in all cases. Substi-
tuting eij = (mitij + θij)/a < 1 in the maximization problem of the principal
yields:
max
wij ,tij ,mi
piij = q + (∆q −mitij)mitij + θij
a
− wij −M(mi) , (2)
18Note that a positive monitoring level also emerges when firms face limits on the penalties
they can impose on workers for shirking. See the discussion in Dickens, Katz, Lang, and
Summers (1989).
19Fixing the minimum payoff in the limited liability constraint to 0 is done without loss of
generality as long as the agent’s reservation utility u¯ ≥ 0 varies.
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subject to a limited liability and a participation constraint:
(LL) wij ≥ 0 , (3)
(PC) uij = (mitij + θij)
2/(2a) + wij ≥ u¯ . (4)
To make sure that inducing effort has some value to the principal in the absence
of intrinsic motivation, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 3. M(m) < min
{
1
4a∆q
2, q
}
The first part of this assumption ensures that the cost of monitoring is not too
high compared to the benefit, i.e., 14a∆q
2 > M(m), while the second part allows
us to concentrate on outcomes with non-negative payoffs for the principal, i.e.,
q > M(m).
Let us define vij as the reservation payoff level such that the participation
constraint of agent j becomes binding and v˜ij as the level where the agent’s
limited liability constraint ceases to be binding. Furthermore, let v¯ij be defined
as the level of reservation payoff of agent j such that principal i makes zero
profit. Under Assumption 3, the three threshold levels of outside utility vij , v˜ij
and v¯ij , are such that 0 < vij ≤ v˜ij ≤ v¯ij .20
The following proposition characterizes the optimal contract in the absence of
bad types.
Proposition 1. : Suppose Assumptions 2 and 3 hold and that xb = 0. An
optimal contract (m∗i , t
∗
ij , w
∗
ij) between a principal in sector i = F,N and an
agent of type j = r, g given a reservation payoff u¯ ∈ [0, v¯ij ] exists and has the
following features:
(a) The optimal wage is
w∗ij = max{0, u¯j −
1
2a
(∆q + θij)
2}
(b) The monitoring level is set at the minimum level whenever extrinsic incen-
tives are necessary, i.e., m∗i = m when tij > 0, and is zero otherwise.
(c) The optimal bonus payment is
t∗ij =


max{0, (∆q − θij)/(2m)} if u¯j ∈ [0, vij ]
(
√
2au¯j − θij)/m if u¯j ∈ (vij , v˜ij)
∆q/m if u¯j ∈ [v˜ij , v¯ij ]
.
20For a precise definition and derivation of these thresholds see part A.1 of the online
appendix.
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θij
u¯
vij
v˜ij
v¯ij
∆q2
8a
∆q2
2a
q −M(m) + ∆q22a
∆q
Case I a Case I b
Case II
Case III
pi < 0
Figure 1: Optimal contract depending on outside utility u¯j and intrinsic motivation θij .
Proof. The proof is in Part A.1 of the online appendix.
We can thus discern three cases:
• Case I: For low values of the reservation utility (u¯ ∈ [0, vij ]), the optimal
contract is described by w∗ij = 0, t
∗
ij = max{0, (∆q − θij)/(2m)}, and
m∗i = m if t
∗
ij > 0 and m
∗
i = 0 otherwise. That is, workers are paid the
minimum wage, monitoring is at its minimum level and the expected bonus
is relatively low. The bonus goes down as intrinsic motivation increases
and may eventually be zero for very high levels of intrinsic motivation, in
which case monitoring is no longer needed (Case Ib).
• Case II: For intermediary values of the reservation utility (u¯ ∈ (vij , v˜ij)),
the optimal contract is described by w∗ij = 0, t
∗
ij = (
√
2au¯j − θij)/m, and
m∗ij = m. That is, while the base wage is still at its minimum level, the
expected bonus is now higher than in Case I.
• Case III: For a high level of reservation utility (u¯ ∈ [v˜ij , v¯ij ]), the optimal
contract is described by w∗ij = u¯ − (∆q + θij)2/(2a), m∗i = m and t∗ij =
∆q/m, i.e., the base wage is relatively high in order to satisfy the worker’s
participation constraint.
Figure 1 gives an overview of the results. The first two cases (i.e., the cases
below the dotted line in Figure 1) are the cases described in Besley and Ghatak
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(2005). The reason why the third case is not relevant in Besley and Ghatak
(2005) is that they do not have a basic payoff q which accrues to the principal
as base production. As a consequence, whenever the incentive scheme is not
profitable because the agent’s outside option is too high, then no contract can
be made. Here, by contrast, the principal can fulfill the agent’s participation
condition even for higher outside options (i.e., u¯ > ∆q2/2a, that is the area
above the horizontal dotted line in Figure 1) because the resulting costs are
still covered by the basic production payoff q. In Sections A.2 and A.3 of the
online appendix, we discuss in more detail how Proposition 1 translates into an
optimal contract in sectors F and N respectively.
Which case is relevant for the principal in sector F depends only on the agent’s
outside option u¯ (vertical axis). The principal in the profit-oriented sector can-
not rely on worker’s intrinsic motivation (i.e., θFj = 0) and hence always has to
provide sufficient extrinsic incentives. In particular, he always has to invest in
monitoring: m∗F = m.
Which case is relevant for the principal in sector N depends both on the agent’s
outside option u¯ and on his level of intrinsic motivation θNj (vertical and hori-
zontal axis). By exploiting the intrinsic motivation of good workers, the princi-
pal in N can save on wage and monitoring costs relative to sector F by offering
lower incentives and making less use of monitoring. Indeed, for any given level
of reservation utility we have: w∗N +m
∗
N t
∗
N ≤ w∗F +m∗F t∗F . As a consequence,
the utility of a regular worker in sector N is always smaller than the utility level
he can reach under the contract proposed in sector F . Regular workers will
hence choose to work in sector F and good workers (i.e., with positive intrinsic
motivation θNg > 0) will prefer to work in sector N . Moreover, in contrast to
sector F , principals in sector N may not need to monitor their workers at all:
If θg > ∆q, workers are motivated enough to provide effort even if there is no
extrinsic incentive and no monitoring (Case I b).
Since, for any positive level of intrinsic motivation, the mission-oriented sector
can save on wage costs, it gives sector N a competitive edge compared to sector
F . Comparing piN with piF , it is hence straightforward to show that piN > piF
if θg > 0.
21
4. Enter the Bad
So far, we have considered the case where intrinsic motivation is necessarily
good for the firm. However, this may not always be true. Workers may pursue
21See Sections A.2 and A.3 in the online appendix for the exact expressions for piF and piN .
A nonprofit does not make any profits by definition. So while we sometimes refer to piN and
piF as profit, it rather measures the relation between personnel costs and production. If the
nonprofit has to spend less on its workers, this eases its budget constraint and makes more
funds available for other things. This becomes particularly relevant if we take into account
that many nonprofits are financed by donations and may have to run their operations on a
rather tight budget.
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their own private benefit to the detriment of the organization they work for. We
model this by allowing workers to choose a destructive effort d ∈ [0, 1], possibly
in addition to the normal effort e. There are some workers who get a private
benefit θb > 0 from choosing such a destructive effort, and by doing so they may
cause a damage D ≥ 0 to the organization employing them.
In contrast to good workers, bad workers have no preference for one or the other
sector. They like to do things that are anti-social independently of the organi-
zation they work for. Consider the following utility function for bad workers in
sector i = F,N :
uib = wi +mitie+ (θb −Kmi)d− a(e+ d)2/2 , (5)
where K is an exogenous punishment that can be imposed on a worker if a
destructive effort is observed. The idea behind this is that a destructive effort
corresponds not just to shirking but is an outright act of sabotage which can be
treated as a criminal offense and hence can be punished by a fine or a prison
term.
The worker can choose to do some constructive effort (i.e., do his job) and
simultaneously some destructive effort by doing what he/she likes and is bad for
the organization.22 However, because of the linear structure of the payoffs and
the quadratic structure of the costs, at the optimum the worker chooses one of
the two options, i.e., he either decides to satisfy his destructive impulse and get
intrinsic satisfaction from doing so (d ≥ 0), or he behaves like a regular worker,
chooses e ≥ 0 and aims at getting monetary rewards. Bad types therefore prefer
to exert a constructive effort rather than to follow their destructive impulse if
and only if23
miti ≥ θb −miK . (6)
To avoid introducing additional notation, we assume that the monitoring tech-
nology is the same for production and sabotage control. This captures the fact
that there are increasing returns to scope in monitoring positive as well as neg-
ative behavior in the workplace. Indeed the equilibrium without sabotage is
either zero monitoring or the minimum level m. This can be interpreted as a
fixed cost type of monitoring technology. Once the fixed costs have been paid the
organization might choose to increase its controls to specifically fight sabotage.
However we could also consider two different monitoring functions/technologies
22In theory, nothing prevents a pyromaniac to be a brave fire fighter or a pedophile to be a
good teacher. We are grateful to Roland Be´nabou for pointing out this fact.
23By contrast if the cost function was a(e2+d2)/2, bad workers would simultaneously choose
e∗
ib
= m
iti
a
and d∗
ib
= θb−Kmi
a
. The gist of our results still applies for this cost function, as
is shown in part A.4 of the online appendix, but their exposition is more complex as two
types of effort need to be considered for bad workers. Here ∂uib/∂e = miti − a(e + d) and
∂uib/∂d = −miK+θb−a(e+d) cannot both be equal to 0 so that e
∗
ib
= 0 and d∗
ib
= θb−Kmi
a
if θb −miK > mit and d
∗
ib
= 0 and e∗
ib
= m
iti
a
otherwise.
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depending on the behavior in response to oversight. Our results are robust to
the introduction of such separate monitoring functions.24
Under Assumption 2 we obtain an interior solution in the effort choice of the
agent. Substituting the worker’s optimal effort choice, his expected utility is
uib = wi +
{
(miti)
2/(2a) if θb ≤ mi(ti +K)
(θb −miK)2/(2a) otherwise.
In the following, we analyze how a bad worker’s choice between sector N and F
is determined and how the contracts in both sectors have to be adapted to the
presence of bad workers. Throughout the paper we assume that if indifferent,
bad workers choose sector F rather than sector N . We first analyze the behav-
ior of bad workers given the benchmark contracts described in Proposition 1.
Which sector will bad workers choose and how will they behave? When are the
benchmark contracts enough to automatically deter anti-social behavior?
4.1. Automatic Deterrence of Bad Workers
We first compare a bad worker’s payoff from choosing a constructive effort e
or destructive effort d in both sectors given the contracts derived in Section
3. This comparison shows that for a given reservation utility u¯ the incentives
for choosing a strictly positive constructive effort are always higher in F than
in N , i.e., uFb(e) > uNb(e). At the same time, the monitoring level in N is
always smaller than or equal to that in sector F , thus making it less likely
to get caught with destructive behavior in the nonprofit sector and therefore
uNb(d) ≥ uFb(d). From this follows that under the contracts of Proposition 1
bad workers only join N to do harm. One could think that this result holds
because the contracts of Proposition 1 have been derived while ignoring the
presence of bad workers. However it goes deeper than that. This result holds
true under any contract where the mission-oriented sector exploits the intrinsic
motivation of good workers. Indeed if it aims to sort out good from regular
workers, the mission-oriented sector has to offer lower monetary incentives than
the profit oriented sector so that intrinsically motivated workers of good type
join, while regular workers choose either not to work or to work in the profit-
oriented sector. Since the bad workers have exactly the same preferences as the
regular workers regarding the provision of constructive effort (i.e., they work for
money), and since by convention they prefer to work in F when their expected
utility is the same in F and N , we deduce that they will never join N to do good.
Bad workers only join N to follow their destructive impulse, while minimizing
the risk of being detected and punished. The next proposition collects this
result.
24For instance the fact that organizations must increase monitoring to fight against sabotage
holds with a separate technology. Similarly the fact that one organization must increase
monitoring more than the other, depending on the parameters of the model, also holds with
a separate monitoring function for sabotage.
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u¯θb
vF v˜F v¯F
θ˜bF
∆q
2 +mK
∆q +mK
uFb(e) > uFb(d)
Automatic deterrence in F
Figure 2: Automatic deterrence in sector F , given outside utility u¯ and level of negative
motivation θb.
Proposition 2. : Bad workers join the mission-oriented sector only to provide
a destructive effort d > 0.
Next, let us look in more detail at what happens in each sector. It is clear from
(6) that for low levels of negative motivation θb, bad workers are better off if
they choose a constructive effort e rather than a destructive effort d. As shown
in Figure 2, in sector F , such automatic deterrence of destructive actions by
bad workers, i.e., deterrence without any change of the contract as derived in
Proposition 1, takes place if θb is smaller than
θ˜bF =


∆q/2 +mK if u¯ ∈ [0, vF ]√
2au¯+mK if u¯ ∈ [vF , v˜F ]
∆q +mK if u¯ ∈ [v˜F , v¯F ]
, (7)
where vF , v˜F , v¯F are the same threshold levels of outside utility as in Proposition
1.25
Let us now turn to the nonprofit sector N . By virtue of Proposition 2, bad
workers will be discouraged from joining this sector if their utility from sabotage
in N is lower than their utility from good behavior in F or their outside utility,
i.e., as long as uNb(d) ≤ uFb(e) or if uNb(d) ≤ u¯. Automatic deterrence, i.e.,
25Recall, that the threshold levels are defined as follows: vF is the reservation payoff level
such that the participation constraint of a regular worker becomes binding and v˜F as the level
where a regular agent’s limited liability constraint ceases to be binding. Furthermore, v¯F is
defined as the level of reservation payoff of a regular agent such that the principal in sector F
makes zero profit. See also Section A.2 of the online appendix.
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deterring bad workers from entering N without any change in the contract
(m∗N , t
∗
N , w
∗
N ), therefore can be achieved for all θb smaller than
θ˜bN ≡
{ √
2a(wF − w∗N ) + (mF tF )2 +m∗NK if u¯ ≤ v¯F√
2a(u¯− w∗N ) +m∗NK if u¯ > v¯F
. (8)
In order to determine the exact level of θ˜bN , we then have to insert the bench-
mark contracts in N and F into equation (8). For the sake of brevity, we will
skip this exercise here. The interested reader may however find more details
in Section A.5 of the online appendix. The results are also shown in Figure
3 which depicts the level of automatic deterrence in the nonprofit sector, θ˜bN ,
as a black curve. For (u¯, θb)-combinations below this curve, bad workers prefer
to work either in sector F or enjoy their outside utility u¯. Furthermore, the
level of automatic deterrence in sector F , θ˜bF , is also featured in Figure 3 and
is depicted as a dashed gray line.26 This allows us to see immediately that,
depending on the exact values of θg, θb and u¯, sector N is either better or worse
protected from destructive behavior than sector F :
• For u¯ > v¯F , i.e., for very high levels of reservation utility, F can no longer
offer contracts that would satisfy the worker’s participation constraint and
at the same time yield a positive payoff to the firm. Therefore, nonprofit
organizations are the only possible employer for agents with such a high
reservation utility. But even working in N is relatively unattractive due
to rather low basic wages. Bad workers will therefore prefer to enjoy their
outside utility u¯ and only the most motivated will find it worthwhile to
work at all. As a result, the level of deterrence in sector N for u¯ > v¯F is
rather high, as can be seen both from Figures 3(a) and 3(b).
• A more relevant scenario is one where u¯ ≤ v¯F , i.e., the outside utility of the
agents is such that both types of organizations may attract workers. Let us
first consider what happens if θg < ∆q as shown in Figure 3(a). For such
low levels of intrinsic motivation of good workers, the level of automatic
deterrence is the same in sector N and F because the monitoring level is
the same in both sectors. Only for v˜F < u¯ ≤ v¯F , automatic deterrence
is slightly higher in N since the basic wage in N is lower than in F and
hence makes working in N less attractive.
• The most interesting case arises for low levels of reservation utility u¯ < vN
and high intrinsic motivation of good workers θg ≥ ∆q as shown in Figure
3(b). In that case, the nonprofit organization relies entirely on the intrinsic
motivation of good workers and hence provides no extrinsic incentives, i.e.,
m∗N = 0 (Case Ib). It then becomes particularly attractive for bad types.
26Note that the threshold levels of outside utility vN , v˜N , and v¯N shown in Figure 3 are
the same as in Proposition 1 and are calculated for good workers. See also Section A.3 of the
online appendix.
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u¯θb
∆q/2 +mK
∆q + θg +mK
vF v˜F v¯F
vN v˜N v¯N
θ˜bF
θ˜bN
Automatic
deterrence in N
(a) θg < ∆q
u¯
θb
∆q/2
θg
θg +mK
∆q + θg +mK
θ˜bF
vF v˜F v¯F
vN v˜N v¯N
θ˜bN
Automatic
deterrence in N
(b) θg > ∆q
Figure 3: Automatic deterrence in N . For combinations of outside utility u¯ and negative
motivation θb in the shaded area, bad workers are automatically deterred from bad actions in
sector N .
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Therefore, all bad workers with θb > ∆q/2 and u¯ < vN will opt for sector
N and provide a destructive effort. Bad workers with a lower θb will choose
sector F and behave like regular workers.27
The analysis in this section provides us with several insights: First, we have
seen that bad workers only join sector N in order to behave in a destructive
way, whereas they may behave like regular workers in sector F . And second,
we have seen that while the low basic wages in N may act as a deterrent for
high levels of reservation utility, the nonprofit sector becomes very vulnerable to
anti-social behavior if it relies heavily on the intrinsic motivation of its workers
and hence does not monitor enough. Finally, whenever θb ≤ θ˜bF and θg < ∆q
the benchmark contracts derived in Proposition 1 are still optimal: Bad workers
join the for profit sector where the extrinsic incentives are strong enough to make
them behave like regular workers such that they go undetected. This equilibrium
result might help to explain why perfectly integrated and normal looking people
might, when their environment and incentives change, start behaving in evil
ways (see Zimbardo, 2004).28
In the following, we analyze how the contracts in both sectors have to change
when the contracts of Proposition 1 do not lead to automatic deterrence.
4.2. Full Deterrence of Bad Workers: large D
In this section, we focus on cases where the damageD is sufficiently large so that
both organizations want to fully deter bad behavior. By virtue of Proposition
2, it is never attractive for bad workers to choose an effort e in sector N since
this sector offers lower monetary incentives to exploit the intrinsic motivation
of good workers. This implies that in an equilibrium with full deterrence of
destructive actions, all the bad workers are either in the for-profit sector and
provide a constructive effort e or they do not work.
Let us first consider what happens in sector F . In the presence of bad workers,
the principal’s maximization problem in sector F becomes29
max
wF ,tF ,mF
piF = q + (∆q −mF tF )mF tF
a
− wF −M(mF ) , (9)
27Note that for θg ≥ ∆q and u¯ > vN , the nonprofit sector is again better protected against
bad workers than the for profit sector (cf. Figure 3(b)): For u¯ > vN , the nonprofit sector has
to implement a minimum level of monitoring even without bad workers, in order to fulfill the
participation constraint of good workers. Combined with the lower basic wage in sector N ,
this makes working there less attractive for bad workers.
28Note that for θg > ∆q, the benchmark contracts are still optimal if θb ≤ min{θ˜bF , θ˜bN}.
Bad workers then work in sector F and behave like regular workers.
29The agent’s incentive constraint is already taken into account here.
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subject to
(LL) wF ≥ 0 ,
(PC) (mF tF )
2/(2a) + wF ≥ u¯ ,
(DET ) mF tF ≥ θb −mFK ,
where the last constraint is new. This deterrence constraint ensures that bad
workers prefer to make a constructive rather than a destructive effort, i.e., it
implies that uFb(d) ≤ uFb(e). Taking into account the new constraint (DET )
in the optimization problem (9) is challenging. Indeed, by introducing the bad
workers, we have to move from an optimization problem with two parameters
of static comparative, u and θg, to three parameters, u, θg, and θb. Depending
on the value of the parameters, different constraints bind and different subcases
have to be considered. For the sake of simplicity, we first derive the optimal
contracts in the case where the outside option of the workers is zero. We next
discuss the robustness of the results in the general case with positive outside
option.
4.2.1. A Simple Illustrative Case: No Reservation Utility
When u¯ = 0, the participation constraint (PC) always holds and the limited
liability constraint (LL) binds, so that wF = wN = 0. This only leaves the
deterrence constraint (DET ) to be considered.
For θb < θ˜bF , there is no need to change the benchmark contracts in sector F .
30
By contrast, if θb > θ˜bF , the (DET ) constraint binds so thatmF tF = θb−mFK
or equivalently tF = θb/mF − K. Substituting this value in (9), the optimal
monitoring level in sector F then solves:
max
mF
piF = q +
[
∆q − (θb −mFK)
]θb −mFK
a
−M(mF ) (10)
SinceM(m) is convex the objective function (10) is strictly concave. The first or-
der condition is sufficient and the optimal monitoring level, denoted m˜F , solves:
2m˜FK +M
′(m˜F )a/K = 2θb −∆q. (11)
Depending on the functional form of M(m) and the value of the different pa-
rameters, the optimal monitoring level calculated above may be smaller than
the minimal monitoring levelm or larger than 1. Since both of these cases are ex-
cluded by assumption, the optimal monitoring level ismdetF = min{max{m, m˜F }, 1}.
It is easy to check that, since m˜F increases with θb, m
det
F increases with θb. Fig-
ure 4 illustrates this result. The figure shows for an outside utility u¯ = 0 how
the monitoring level and expected bonus develop as θb increases.
31
30For u¯ = 0, the benchmark contracts in F are given by: w∗
F
= 0, m∗
F
= m, t∗
F
= ∆q/(2m) .
There is automatic deterrence up to a level of negative motivation θ˜bF = ∆q/2 +mK.
31Figure 4 is drawn for the monitoring function M(m) = m2/2, which implies that m˜F =
(2θb −∆q)/(2K + a/K). Furthermore, it is based on q = 2,∆q = 1.4, a = 15, m = 0.1, and
K = 3.
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θb
m∗F t
∗
F =
∆q
2
mdetF t
det
F
m
mdetF
1
θ˜bF
Figure 4: Monitoring and expected bonus level for outside utility u¯ = 0 and monitoring cost
function M(m) = m2/2, depending on the level of negative intrinsic motivation θb.
To sum up, when u¯ = 0, the optimal contract with full deterrence of destructive
behavior in F is
{wdetF ,mdetF , tdetF } ≡
{
0, m, ∆q/(2m) if θb ≤ θ˜bF
0, min{max{m, m˜F }, 1}, θb/mdetF −K if θb > θ˜bF
(12)
To fully deter bad workers from bad actions, the principal in sector F can use
two tools. He can increase rewards for good behavior and/or punishment for
bad behavior. By combining stick and carrot he optimizes his profit. One can
check that m˜F in (11) is strictly lower than m when θb = θ˜bF .
32 For θb close to
the threshold θ˜bF , the principal keeps monitoring at its minimum level m, and
just increases the rewards for good behavior so that tdetF > t
∗. In other words,
for moderate levels of θb the carrot is sufficient (see Figure 4).
However, such a scheme will not entice workers with a high negative motivation
to behave well. To deter such extreme types from anti-social behavior, it is
not enough to make a positive effort more attractive, but also the expected
punishment for bad behavior has to increase. The principal therefore has to
raise the monitoring level beyond its minimum level to m˜detF . Equation (11)
then implies that mdetF t
det
F = θb −KmdetF = ∆q/2 + M
′(m˜F )a
2K > ∆q/2 = m
∗
F t
∗
F .
We deduce that in the for-profit sector the expected bonus payment for good
effort increases relative to the benchmark case without bad workers: if θb > θ˜bF
then mdetF t
det
F > m
∗
F t
∗
F . This result is illustrated in Figure 4. As a consequence,
32For instance with M(m) = m2/2, if θ˜bF < θb ≤ θ˜bF + am/(2K) then m˜F = (2θb −
∆q)/(2K + a/K) ≤ m.
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besides deterring bad workers from bad actions, this contract will also induce
regular workers to choose a higher effort level, in some cases above the first best
level (i.e., for θb very large m
det
F t
det
F > ∆q).
We next turn to the non-profit sector. The wage scheme defined in Proposition
1 does not need to be adapted as long as θb ≤ θ˜bN .33 Now if θb > θ˜bN , two cases
hold:
• Case Ia: For low levels of positive intrinsic motivation (i.e., θg < ∆q), the
monitoring in N in the benchmark case is the same as in F and hence
θ˜bN = θ˜bF . If θb exceeds this threshold level, F implements the optimal
contract {mdetF , tdetF , wdetF } described in (12) to deter bad workers from
sabotage. Given this contract, bad workers will prefer to switch to N
and misbehave there if ubN (d) > u
det
bF (e). To prevent this, it is necessary
and sufficient that N raises its monitoring level to the one used in F :
mdetN = m
det
F .
• Case Ib: For high levels of positive intrinsic motivation (i.e., θg ≥ ∆q),
N does not monitor at all in the benchmark case and as a result the level
of automatic deterrence is lower than in sector F , i.e., θ˜bN < θ˜bF . If the
level of negative motivation is somewhere between these two values,34 then
ubN (d) > ubF (e) > ubF (d). That is, given the benchmark contracts, all
bad guys will be in sector N , making a destructive effort since there is no
monitoring in N . However, N can fully deter bad workers from joining by
raising mN from 0 to the level of monitoring in F , i.e., m
det
N = m = m
∗
F .
35
If θb > θ˜bF , then the same results as before apply. That is, F has to
choose the optimal contract {mdetF , tdetF , wdetF } described in (12) to deter
bad actions by bad workers, whereas N optimally deters bad workers from
joining by imitating F ’s choice of monitoring level: mdetN = m
det
F .
We conclude that if the level of motivation of bad workers is higher than θ˜bN ,
then in an equilibrium with full deterrence in both sectors, mdetN = m
det
F . With
bad workers, the mission-oriented sector thus looses much of its cost advantage
compared to the for-profit sector. The loss is particularly high when good work-
ers are very motivated, i.e., if θg ≥ ∆q: in this case, the presence of bad workers
means that N has to go from no monitoring at all to whatever monitoring there
is in the for-profit sector. By raising the level of monitoring, destructive behav-
ior in N becomes sufficiently unattractive and bad workers prefer to behave like
regular workers in sector F .
How do these changes in incentive schemes affect good workers? For high enough
intrinsic motivation of good workers (θg > m
det
F t
det
F −m∗N t∗N ), N has no need
33With u¯ = 0 the benchmark contract in sector N is: w∗N = 0, m
∗
N = m, t
∗
N = (∆q −
θg)/(2m) if θg < ∆q (i.e., Case Ia) and w∗N = m
∗
N = t
∗
N = 0 if θg ≥ ∆q (i.e., Case Ib).
34That is, if θ˜bN = ∆q/2 < θb < θ˜bF = ∆q/2 +mK.
35Note that F has no need to change its benchmark contracts since bad workers have no
incentive to behave badly in F anyway.
20
to increase the incentives for good behavior. As mN goes up, tN can decrease
(Case Ia) or stay at tN = 0 (Case Ib) such that the overall incentives for good
workers stay the same. Only if θg is small, good workers may be tempted to
switch to sector F since this sector now offers higher rewards for good behavior.
In that case, N needs also to increase the bonus payment to retain good workers,
but less so than F . Even with full deterrence of bad workers, the wage bill in
sector N therefore is still lower than in sector F .
4.2.2. Equilibrium Results in the General Case: u¯ ≥ 0
We contrast the results obtained in the particular case where u¯ = 0 with the
results obtained in the general case where u¯ ≥ 0. The details of the computation
of the optimal full deterrence contracts can be found in Section B of the online
appendix.
For high values of negative intrinsic motivation θb, the deterrence constraint
binds. The principal in F needs to raise the expected bonus to make a con-
structive effort more attractive and/or the monitoring level to make a destructive
effort less attractive. For parameter values such that the (LL) and (PC) con-
straints are binding simultaneously (i.e., kif Case II holds), both in the bench-
mark scenario and in the scenario with full deterrence, the optimal monitoring
level is strictly higher than m, whereas the expected bonus is mdetF t
det
F = m
∗
F t
∗
F .
In all other cases, the principal raises the bonus payment first (the “carrot”), be-
fore he starts to raise the monitoring level (the“stick”) so thatmdetF t
det
F > m
∗
F t
∗
F .
The exact details of the resulting optimal contracts are derived in Proposition
B.1 in the online appendix.
Sector N can achieve full deterrence by raising the monitoring level just high
enough that another option - either moving to F or enjoying their outside utility
- becomes more attractive for bad workers. For low levels of outside utility
(u¯ < v˜F ), this condition translates into choosing the same monitoring level as in
sector F , whereas for high levels of outside utility (u¯ ≥ v˜F ) the monitoring level
in N has to increase, but slightly less so than in F . This is due to the fact that
for high reservation utility, the basic wage in N is smaller than in F , making
work in N less attractive anyway (see Section B.3 of the online appendix).
The next proposition collects these results.
Proposition 3. Assume u¯ ≥ vF . In an equilibrium with full deterrence of
destructive behavior:
• The bad workers are all in sector F and behave like regular workers.
• In F , monitoring increases, mdetF ≥ m∗F , and incentives become steeper,
mdetF t
det
F ≥ m∗F t∗F .
• In N , monitoring increases, mdetN ≥ m∗N , while monetary incentives stay
the same, mdetN t
det
N = m
∗
N t
∗
N .
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(a) θg < ∆q
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(b) θg > ∆q
Figure 5: Equilibria with full deterrence in both sectors, depending on outside utility u¯ and
the level of negative intrinsic motivation θb.
22
Sector F optimally combines the carrot and the stick to induce bad workers
to choose a constructive effort and behave like regular workers, while sector N
relies on the stick to keep them away. This last result is obtained under the
assumption that u¯ is not too small (i.e., u¯ ≥ vF ).
By contrast, when u¯ is smaller than vF , for instance when u¯ = 0, the individual
rationality constraint does not bind and the limited liability constraint binds,
which implies that the workers in F earn strictly positive rents. Sector N has
to make sure that good workers still get a higher payoff from working in N
rather than in F . If good workers have a weak intrinsic motivation (i.e., if
θg < m
det
F t
det
F −m∗N t∗N ) and a low reservation utility (i.e., if u¯ < vF ), they will
prefer to switch sectors, unless N also raises its bonus level. Yet, as before, N
does not have to go all the way in imitating F since it still can count on the
intrinsic motivation of good workers. In other words, monetary incentives in N
have to be raised such that mdetF t
det
F > m
det
N t
det
N > m
∗
N t
∗
N if and only if θb > θ˜bN ,
u¯ < vF and θg < m
det
F t
det
F −m∗N t∗N . In all other cases there is no need to adjust
monetary incentives: mdetN t
det
N = m
∗
N t
∗
N .
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) illustrate the equilibrium outcomes depending on u¯ and
θb. Overall, we distinguish five different cases characterized as follows:
Area A: With the benchmark contracts uFb(e) > uFb(d) and uFb(e) > uNb(d).
Therefore, bad workers are in F and behave like regular workers.
Area B: For workers with such a high reservation utility, F is not active and
only N is a possible employer. However, with the benchmark contracts,
uNb(d) < u¯. Joining N is not attractive and bad workers prefer to enjoy
their outside utility.
Area C: With the benchmark contracts uFb(d) > uFb(e) and uFb(e) > uNb(d).
There is automatic deterrence in sector N , but not in sector F . In equi-
librium, F opts for the full deterrence contracts described in Proposition
B.1 in the online appendix, whereas N can keep its benchmark contract.
All bad workers are in sector F where they choose e.
Area D: With the benchmark contracts uFb(e) > uFb(d) and uNb(d) > uFb(e).
There is automatic deterrence in F , but N has to introduce minimal mon-
itoring m. Bad workers are in F where they choose e.
Area E: With the benchmark contracts uFb(d) > uFb(e) and uNb(d) > uFb(e).
To achieve full deterrence, contracts in both sectors have to be adapted
as described in Propositions B.1 and B.2 in the online appendix. Bad
workers choose either (F, e) or u¯.36
36The latter holds if only N is a possible employer.
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4.3. Partial Deterrence: low D
So far we have considered that the damage D is so large that full deterrence of
destructive behavior is the best option. However, under certain circumstances,
some destructive behavior may induce only limited damage. In this section, we
therefore consider the possibility that destructive behavior occurs in equilibrium.
Let βi ∈ [0, 1) be the share of bad workers in sector i = N,F . Recall that
θNg = θg and θFg = 0. Taking into account the agent’s optimal effort choice,
the principal’s maximization problem in sector i = N,F corresponds to
max
wi,ti,mi
pii = (1− βi)(∆q −miti)miti+θiga − βiD θb−miKa + q − wi −M(mi) (13)
subject to the worker’s limited liability and participation constraint as stated in
(3) and (4). There is no need to adapt the benchmark contracts of Proposition
1 when θb ≤ θ˜bi. We focus on the case where θb > θ˜bi. Optimizing (13), using
the first order condition on ti, yields for mi:
37
M ′(m˜parti ) =
βiD
a
K. (14)
Since m˜parti is not necessarily comprised betweenm and 1, if it is strictly positive,
the optimal monitoring level under partial deterrence is
mparti = min{max{m, m˜parti }, 1} .
The level of monitoring, which is independent of θb, increases with the dam-
age done by bad workers, D, and their share in the population of sector i, βi.
Moreover, when the reservation utility is not too high (i.e., so that the limited
liability constraint binds as in Cases I and II in Proposition C.3 in the online
appendix), the optimal bonus solves mparti t
part
i = m
∗
i t
∗
i . The optimal contract
with partial deterrence has thus two main features: The organization tries to
limit damages and to discourage destructive behavior through higher monitor-
ing, mparti ≥ m∗i , while keeping the same expected payoff from constructive
effort as in the benchmark contract, mparti t
part
i = m
∗
i t
∗
i .
All bad workers face the same tradeoffs. In equilibrium either all or none of
them are in sector i = N,F such that βi ∈ {0, β¯i}, where β¯F ≡ xb/(xb + xr)
and β¯N ≡ xb/(xb+ xg). Since by Assumption 1, there are more regular workers
than good ones, β¯F =
xb
xb+xr
< β¯N =
xb
xb+xg
such that m˜partF ≤ m˜partN in (14).
Bad workers will rather work in F where their probability of detection is lower
than in N . We deduce that, as long as F is active, sector N never implements
partial deterrence. The only case where the principal in N might opt for partial
37To see this point let u¯ = 0 so that the (PC) constraint never binds while the (LL) constraint
binds. Setting wi = 0 and optimizing (13) with respect to ti and mi yields: m
part
i t
part
i =
max {0, (∆q − θig)/2} and m
part
i = min{max{m, m˜
part
i }, 1}, where m˜
part
i solves (14). For
the general case see the proof of Proposition C.3 in the online appendix.
24
mF
θb
0
m
1
θ˜bF
mdetF
mpartF
(a) Monitoring
piF
θb
pi∗F
pidetF
θ˜bF
pipartF
(b) Profit
Figure 6: Comparison of monitoring levels and profit in F under full and partial deterrence,
depending on the level of negative intrinsic motivation θb. The graphs are drawn for M(m) =
m2/2 and u = 0. m denotes the minimum monitoring level, and θ˜bF the level of negative
motivation above which bad workers are no longer automatically deterred from bad behavior
under the benchmark contract in F .
deterrence is when the reservation utility of regular workers is so high that only
sector N is a possible employer. In all other cases, N implements either full
deterrence (i.e., by choosing the same/lower monitoring level as in sector F
depending on the value of u¯), or no deterrence at all. To see this point consider
the case where θg ≥ ∆q and u¯ ∈ [0, vN ] so that the benchmark contract in
N is w∗N = m
∗
N = t
∗
N = 0. In presence of bad workers this contract yields
the profit Π∗N = q + (1 − β¯N )∆qθg/a − β¯NDθb/a, while the full deterrence
profit is ΠdetN = q + ∆qθg/a −M(mdetN ). The former is higher than the latter
if [aM(mdetN )(1 + xg/xb) − Dθb]/∆q ≤ θg. Then, N sticks to its benchmark
contracts even if it attracts all bad workers. The next proposition collects this
result.38
Proposition 4. : As long as both sectors are active, full deterrence in N is
optimal unless u¯ ∈ [0, vN ] and [aM(mdetN )(1 + xg/xb)−Dθb]/∆q > θg ≥ ∆q, in
which case sector N sticks to the benchmark contract w∗N = m
∗
N = t
∗
N = 0.
Except when the intrinsic motivation of good workers is very high and the
expected damage caused by bad workers is sufficiently low, sector N adapts its
monitoring to deter bad workers from joining and the for-profit sector is again
38The full description of the equilibrium with partial deterrence is derived in Section C.2 of
the online appendix.
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confronted with bad workers. Whether the principal in sector F then prefers
full deterrence of destructive behavior or whether he opts for partial deterrence
depends on his respective expected profit in the two cases. Under the former
regime, his expected profit is
pidetF = q + (∆q −mdetF tdetF )
mdetF t
det
F
a
− wdetF −M(mdetF ) ,
whereas in the latter case his profit becomes
pipartF = (1− βF )(∆q −mpartF tpartF )
mpartF t
part
F
a
− βFD
θb −mpartF K
a
+q − wpartF −M(mpartF ) .
As can be seen easily from the second function, the expected profit with partial
deterrence is strictly decreasing in the share of bad workers in sector F , βF
and in the damage these workers may cause D. If, for instance, the number of
regular workers in the population xr is very high, this implies that the relative
share of bad workers in sector F , βF , is low and full deterrence hence is less
attractive. Furthermore, the monitoring technology also plays a role. If the
marginal cost of an increased level of monitoring is high, then full deterrence
may be too costly.
These considerations are illustrated in Figure 6.39 The graph shows that for
a given level of βF and D, full deterrence is optimal as long as the intrinsic
motivation of bad workers, θb, is low. However, as θb increases, full deterrence
becomes too costly and the principal hence prefers partial deterrence. Note,
however, that this conclusion depends on the exact level of βF and D. For
extreme cases such as very low levels of βF and/or D, i.e., when m
part
F is close
to m, the profit under partial deterrence would be higher than the profit under
full deterrence over the entire relevant range of θb values, whereas the opposite
is true if βF and/or D are so high that m
part
F is close to 1.
5. Discussion and Implications in Child Care
The analysis in Section 4 has important implications for labor management, es-
pecially in nonprofit organizations. The presence of ill motivated people always
spells trouble for these organizations since such workers never join nonprofits to
do good. It is not easy to find empirical evidence to illustrate this result in eco-
nomic studies as they focus on standard moral hazard issues (e.g., free-riding,
shirking at work), but do not generally consider negative intrinsic motivation.
By contrast, anti-social behaviors have been the focus of researchers in other
fields of social science and in medicine. In particular, there is a vast literature
39The graphs are drawn for u = 0, q = 2,∆q = 1.4, a = 15, m = 0.1, K = 3, xb = 0.2, xr =
0.5,D = 3 and M(m) = m2/2.
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in modern psychiatry, psychology and sociology on the issue of pedophilia. We
thus rely on these studies to illustrate some of our results in the context of child
care services.
The example of child care is relevant as it is an area where both for-profit
and nonprofit organizations coexist to offer services (e.g., in daycare, education,
sports training, music, hobbies, transport, vacation). It is also an area that tends
to instill high intrinsic motivation in people, generally good, but sometimes also
bad, as in the case of pedophiles.
Pedophilia is defined by health professionals as a mental disorder, which has
yet no cure.40 Recently, researchers began reporting a series of findings linking
pedophilia with brain structure and function, suggesting that genetic factors
play a role in the development of this paraphilia (Gaffney et al. 1984; Schiffer
et al. 2007; Schiltz et al. 2007; Walter et al. 2007; Cantor at al. 2008; Schiffer
et al. 2008). The typical offender is male, begins molesting by age 15, engages
in a variety of deviant behaviors, and molests an average of 117 youngsters
(Abel, 1985). However the most serious and chronic offenders often show signs
of antisocial behavior as early as the preschool years (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994).41 These findings are consistent with the assumption made
in the paper that negative intrinsic motivation is exogenous.
Contrary to common belief, pedophiles generally know their victims. Acquain-
tance perpetrators are hence the most common abusers, constituting approxi-
mately 70-90% of all reported perpetrators (Finkelhor, 1994; Whealin and Bar-
nett, 2007). For instance in US schools “nearly 9.6% of students are targets
of educator sexual misconduct”. Teachers, coaches, substitute teachers, bus
drivers and teacher’s aides are in decreasing order totaling 69% of the offenders
(Shakeshaft, 2004, p.24-25).42 Consistently with our theory, studies show that
40The International Classification of Diseases (ICD) defines pedophilia as a “disorder of
adult personality and behavior” in which there is a sexual preference for children of prepubertal
or early pubertal age. Similarly the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM), defines it as a paraphilia in which a person has intense and recurrent sexual urges
towards and fantasies about prepubescent children and on which feelings they have either
acted or which cause distress or interpersonal difficulty.
41A Mayo Clinic report states that approximately 95% of incidents of sexual abuse of chil-
dren age 12 and younger are committed by offenders who meet the diagnostic criteria for
pedophilia. While pedophilic child molesters make up “only” 65% of child molestation of-
fenders, they commit ten times more sexual acts against children than non-pedophilic child
molesters explaining the discrepancy between these two statistics (Hall and Hall, 2007).
42According to the FBI, child molestation is with rape one of the most underreported crimes.
Although it is difficult to measure with accuracy because of the massive underreporting,
all existing studies show that child sexual abuse is quite common in advanced economies.
Studies in the United States hence show that 17% to 31% of females and 7% to 16% of
males experienced unwanted sexual contact before the age of 18 years (Hall and Hall, 2007;
Finkelhor, 1994). Similarly, two Canadian studies, which randomly sampled 750 women and
750 men between the ages of 18 and 27 years, found that 32% of the women and 15.6% of the
men had experienced “unwanted sexual contact” before the age of 17 (Hall and Hall, 2007).
Studies in the UK estimate prevalence at about 5% to 8% for boys and 12% to 18% for girls
(Baker and Duncan, 1985; Radford, Corral, Bradley, Fisher, Bassett, Howat, and Collishaw,
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pedophiles tend to choose occupations where they have the opportunity to inter-
act with children in an unsupervised way. They often have good interpersonal
skills and can easily gain the trust of children and their parents. If they do not
work directly with children, they volunteer their services to sport teams, Scout
troops, or religious or civic organizations that serve youth.43 They sometimes
also become foster parents to have an easy access to vulnerable children (Hall
and Hall, 2007).
The analysis in Section 4 shows that the mission-oriented sector is the target of
bad people whenever it relies heavily on the intrinsic motivation of its workers
and does not monitor enough. We thus predict an over-representation of pe-
dophiles in organizations that deal with youth and exert a lax control over their
members. This helps to explain the magnitude of sexual abuse scandals that
hit the Catholic Church, particularly in the US and in Ireland. According to
the last statistic of the Bishop Accountability.org web site, 6,115 priests have
been exposed in the US by their archdioceses as pedophile, representing 5.6%
of the 109,694 priests in ministry during the period 1950-2002. This number
appears to be a lower bound. Indeed in US dioceses compelled to release inter-
nal abuse files to law enforcement authorities or the public (i.e., in Providence,
Philadelphia, Manchester, Covington) the percentage of accused priests is close
to 10 percent.44 Although it is difficult to establish the exact percentage of child
abusers in the general population, it is much lower than 10 or even 6 percent,
as pedophilia is a rare disorder. For instance in their 1993 nationwide survey
on sexual practices for the US, Janus and Janus (1993) found that 2 percent of
sampled males reported having had sex with a child. In another study, 1 percent
of males, who were anonymously surveyed, reported having sexually assaulted a
child themselves since they became an adult (Bagley, Wood, and Young, 1994).
Finally, Seto (2008) suggests that perhaps 3% of men are sexually attracted to
prepubescent children.
According to the theory above, the over-representation of child molesters in the
catholic clergy is the result of a policy of laissez-faire by the church’s dioceses
and parishes. Indeed, data in the 2011 John Jay report indicate that, when
allegations of abuse were made, the majority of diocesan leaders took actions to
help “rehabilitate”the abusive priests rather than to focus on the victims (Terry
et al., 2011). Most other cases involving the Catholic church were handled in a
similar way. In the scandals involving the Catholic Brothers in Ireland, abusers
had hence nothing to fear because everything was covered up and there was no
punishment to be expected, just possibly a transfer to a different school (CICA,
2011).
43This point is illustrated by the case of the late BBC presenter Jimmy Savile, who publicly
was seen as a modern days saint for his efforts to help children and youth through his TV
shows and extensive fund raising, while at the same time he apparently used his position to
molest and abuse minors and young women. See the so-called Yewtree Report by Gray and
Watt (2013).
44See also the Sipe Report at http://www.richardsipe.com/reports/sipe\ report\ X.htm en-
titled“Public disclosure cause no. 141-198356-03 in the district court of Tarrant county, Texas”
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2009). This explains that in addition to the criminal prosecutions of the abusers
there have been many civil lawsuits against the Catholic hierarchy who failed
to report sex abuse allegations to the legal authorities and misled victims by
deliberately relocating the accused priests.45 In the United States alone the
various Roman Catholic Dioceses have paid out approximately $1 billion to
settle hundreds of such lawsuits since the early 1990s.
An interesting question is how malevolently motivated individuals, such as pe-
dophiles, could have been tolerated by mission-oriented organizations along the
equilibrium path.46 According to the theory this can only happen when the cost
- to the organization - of such actions is relatively low.47 The implication then
is that these cases of sexual abuse of children were not costly to church-based
organizations in the not so distant past because so much secrecy persisted, and
victims were too ashamed to speak out.48 Without public reckoning, the orga-
nizations could simply carry on, while exposing the pedophile would have had
a dramatic impact on the number of churchgoers and on the Church’s funding.
For the organizations, the costs of the scandal were higher than the costs in
terms of adverse effects on human lives by tolerating acts of pedophilia. This
is illustrated by the CICA report on Ireland: “Cases of sexual abuse were man-
aged with a view to minimising the risk of public disclosure and consequent
damage to the institution and the Congregation. (· · · ) The desire to protect the
reputation of the Congregation and institution was paramount. Congregations
asserted that knowledge of sexual abuse was not available in society at the time
and that it was seen as a moral failing on the part of the Brother or priest.
This assertion, however, ignores the fact that sexual abuse of children was a
criminal offence”, (CICA, 2009, pp. 21-22). What is puzzling though, is that
mission-motivated individuals, who themselves were not abusive, allowed this to
continue and covered things up. One explanation for this may be loyalty within
organizations as described in the CICA report: “Congregational loyalty enjoyed
priority over other considerations including safety and protection of children,”
(CICA, 2009, p. 22). Another motive may be a prevailing norm that wrongdoers
deserve a second chance to redeem themselves.49 This position is summarized by
45Charges have also been brought against the government. In January 2014, the European
Court of Human Rights ruled that the Irish State had failed to put in place “any mechanism of
effective State control against the risks of such abuse occurring”(cf. Grand chamber judgement
O’Keefe vs. Ireland, January 28, 2014.
46We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this discussion.
47Only if the damage and the relative share of bad workers are very small, it is cheaper for
N to accept the presence of bad workers rather than to deter them.
48According to the CICA report on Ireland (CICA, 2009, p. 14): “[Contemporary] com-
plaints were ignored, witnesses were punished, or pressure was brought to bear on the child
and family to deny the complaint and/or to remain silent. Witnesses reported that their sense
of shame, the power of the abuser, the culture of secrecy and isolation and the fear of physical
punishment inhibited them in disclosing abuse.”
49In a report on the incidents in the Archdiocese of Chicago, the Chicago Tribune summa-
rizes: “The clergymen (· · · ) were shielded by Roman Catholic Church officials who thought
the men could be cured with counseling, by bishops blinded by a belief in second chances and
forgiveness, and by leaders concerned a public scandal would damage the church’s image.”
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Salesian Cardinal Oscar Rodriguez of Honduras: “For me it would be a tragedy
to reduce the role of a pastor to that of a cop. I’d be prepared to go to jail
rather than harm one of my priests.”
In sharp contrast with previous studies, our results show that nonprofit organiza-
tions cannot save on monitoring costs if they are willing to fulfill their missions.
Monitoring not only helps to keep track of workers’ good performances, but
it is also the main tool to control sabotage and anti-social behaviors. In the
theory above, we did not discuss the exact nature of the monitoring technol-
ogy. However, in practice it can take different forms from standard monitoring
by supervisors at the work site to camera and audio recording (e.g., in police
cars). The problem is that in some cases (i.e., in time of crisis, in remote loca-
tions, when job requirements imply working outside the organization) it is very
difficult to monitor workers. To prevent destructive behavior, organizations
might choose to promote peer monitoring.50 Empirical studies such as Knez
and Simester (2001) and Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan (2003) have found
that team incentives and mutual monitoring may indeed have positive effects
on workers’ effort. Sometimes information campaigns may be enough to raise
the awareness of potential misbehavior and thus alert coworkers and employers
to keep their eyes open. This approach has for instance been proposed by the
South Carolina Forestry Commission to address fire fighter arson which is not
an uncommon problem (see Stambaugh and Styron (2003)). In other cases, peer
monitoring can be induced through simple institutional features, such as letting
employees work pairwise, as it is common for police officers, hiring couples, or
providing joint housing for aid workers.51 While this may give rise to collusion
among evil-doers as in the United Nation “sex for food” scandals, such a scheme
is likely to work reasonably well if there are enough good motivated workers who
care about the mission of the organization they work for. In this case promoting
heterogeneity in the workforce composition is a good way to avoid collusion of
the bad.
Finally, while our model suggests that, in general, organizations should increase
their monitoring efforts to deal with the problem of negative intrinsic motiva-
tion, this increase of ex post monitoring may be very costly, and, as illustrated
in Figure 6, for high levels of negative motivation it becomes even entirely in-
effective. Firms therefore may want to invest in ex ante measures of screening
to reduce the probability of hiring a bad worker in the first place. A better
candidate selection process thus can serve as a (partial) substitute for worker
(Chicago Tribune, January 21, 2014).
50There are relatively few theoretical papers on peer monitoring, exceptions being Barron
and Gjerde (1997) and Kandel and Lazear (1992), who both analyze the interaction between
peer pressure and the provision of incentives in teams.
51The French service for teaching abroad prefers to hire couples, not only for monitoring
reasons, but also because they have been found to withstand stress caused by a new envi-
ronment better. “German Doctors”, a German NGO provides joint housing to doctors doing
short term volunteer work.
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monitoring.52 The higher the expected damage of hiring a bad worker, the more
an organization or firm will be inclined to invest in applicant screening. This is
observed in sectors where candidates, once hired, are difficult to fire, as for ex-
ample civil servants53 or where the stakes are high as for instance in intelligence
services.54 In other cases, establishing a clearer profile of bad workers may help.
This has, for instance, been done in the US to prevent fire fighter arson.55 In
the case of child care, legal requirements may also play an important role in
order to help employers screen out bad workers.56
6. Conclusion
The existence of destructive workers who derive satisfaction from actions that
are detrimental to their employer or others has an impact on the optimal mon-
itoring and wage contracts offered in organizations. In particular, we discussed
how this affects nonprofit organizations that rely on the intrinsic motivation of
their workers. Without bad workers, the mission-oriented sector N can save
on wage and monitoring costs compared to the profit-oriented sector F . If the
intrinsic motivation of good workers is high enough, it may even forego bonus
payments and monitoring altogether. However, the lack of monitoring and ex-
trinsic incentives makes N particularly vulnerable to destructive behavior by
bad workers. Indeed, when bad workers join the nonprofit sector it is only to
follow their destructive instincts and not because they want to provide a con-
structive effort.
Unless the damage and the relative share of bad workers are very small, in which
case it is cheaper for N to accept their presence, the equilibrium solutions both
under full and partial deterrence show that N will always want to change its
contracts to deter bad workers from joining. To do so, sectorN needs to increase
its monitoring level, which erodes its cost advantage compared to the for-profit
sector. To what extent this is the case also depends on the level of motivation
52See Huang (2007) and Huang and Cappelli (2006) for a discussion on the possible tradeoff
between worker monitoring and ex ante applicant screening.
53Goldman (1982) and Greenberg and Haley (1986) discuss this issue for the case of judges
in the United States.
54The selection process in these cases can be quite lengthy and generally involves all kinds
of tests and background checks. See for instance the CIA web site at www.cia.gov/careers/
faq/index.html#a3, or the FBI one www.fbijobs.gov/61.asp#3
55Studies by the South Carolina Forestry Commission and the FBI (see Stambaugh and
Styron (2003) for a summary of both studies) have found that arsonists are typically white
males between 17 and 26 years of age, with a difficult family background, lacking social and
interpersonal skills, often of average intelligence but with poor academic performance. Also,
arson seems to be more likely with volunteer fire fighters than with professionals ones.
56In Germany, for instance, employers can ask applicants to a job that may bring them
in contact with children or youths for an “extended police clearance certificate” (“erweitertes
Fu¨hrungszeugnis”), documenting any offence including cases of molestation, child pornogra-
phy, exhibitionism etc.
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of good workers: For high enough motivation of good workers, the mission-
oriented sector can achieve full deterrence by choosing the same monitoring
level as in sector F , but otherwise keeping extrinsic incentives at the same level
as before. That is, to the same extent that the monitoring level increases, the
bonus payment decreases such that the overall effort incentives are still at their
optimal level. The mission-oriented sector therefore still may enjoy a certain
cost advantage, since it is cheaper to get already motivated workers to provide
effort.
Given this optimal reaction of sector N , sector F will be confronted with bad
workers. In order to reduce their negative impact, the profit-oriented sector has
to increase its bonuses and its monitoring levels. We showed that to achieve full
deterrence of destructive actions by bad workers, F may even have to increase
effort incentives beyond the first best level. Overall, the optimal incentive poli-
cies of sectors N and F imply that, in equilibrium, all bad workers are generally
in F where they behave like regular workers. It is important to note, however,
that to achieve this equilibrium outcome it is not enough to reward good behav-
ior better, but both kinds of organization have to invest in monitoring to deter
bad behavior.
A question that remains open is why some organizations in the mission oriented
sector are not implementing the optimal contract in the first place and, even
worse, hide crimes from the general public, thereby protecting the bad agents.
Although answering this question is beyond the scope of the paper, we want to
discuss an hypothesis that we wish to investigate in future work. In order to
focus on the incentive problems raised by the presence of bad workers, we have
not taken into account other differences between profit- and mission-oriented
organizations. Yet it may be worthwhile to take a look at those differences, in
particular the way organizations are financed: While profit-oriented organiza-
tions usually have to survive on the proceeds from their sales, which provides
them with strong incentives to please their customers, many mission-oriented
organizations are run as non-governmental organizations or associations that
essentially depend on donations. For them, the scandal caused by bad workers
may hence also have considerable negative consequences for their funding, thus
making deterrence of bad workers all the more important. However, it also pro-
vides strong incentives to hide bad actions by their workers, hence implicitly
encouraging them to continue.
Another aspect that needs to be discussed is the effect of control on the intrinsic
motivation of good workers. There is a recent literature on the crowding out
of intrinsic motivation by extrinsic incentives or control.57 Taking into account
such effects would mean that the more the mission-oriented sector N increases
monitoring in order to prevent damage from bad workers, the lower would be the
intrinsic motivation of good workers. N would therefore also have to increase
his monetary incentives in order to induce good workers to work hard enough,
57See Seabright (2009), Frey and Jegen (2001), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997).
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thus losing its cost advantage. Eventually, good intrinsic motivation would
disappear all together and organizations in sector N would operate under the
same conditions as firms in the profit-oriented sector F and also offer the same
contracts.
However, it is unclear to what extent such crowding out of intrinsic motivation
actually exists in the context considered here. Motivation crowding out seems
to be affected by other factors than the level of monitoring, such as framing
and general treatment by the employer (Nagin et al., 2002). As Akerlof and
Kranton (2008) underline, “What matters is not more or less monitoring per
se, but how employees think of themselves in relation to the firm” (Akerlof and
Kranton (2008), p. 212). If it is made clear that monitoring is increased in
order to reduce fraud and anti-social behavior, the motivation of good workers
should not be too much affected.
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A Proofs for Basic Setup
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
After inserting the incentive constraint, the maximization problem stated in
(2) to (4) can be rewritten as the following Lagrangian:
max
wij ,mi,tij ,λLL,λPC
L = q + (∆q −mitij)(mitij + θij)1
a
− wij −M(mi)
+ λLLwij + λPC(wij + (mitij + θij)
2/(2a)− u¯j) ,
where λLL and λPC are the respective Lagrange multipliers of the limited
liability and the participation constraint. and the corresponding first-order
conditions are
∂L
∂wij
= −1 + λLL + λPC ≤ 0 , (A.1)
∂L
∂tij
=
mi
a
[∆q − 2mitij − θij + λPC(mitij + θij)] ≤ 0 , (A.2)
∂L
∂mi
=
tij
a
[∆q − 2mitij − θij + λPC(mitij + θij)]−M ′(mi) ≤ 0 ,(A.3)
∂L
∂λLL
= wij ≥ 0 , (A.4)
∂L
∂λPC
= wij + (mitij + θij)
2/(2a)− u¯j ≥ 0 , (A.5)
0 = λLLwij , (A.6)
0 = λPC(wij + (mitij + θij)
2/(2a)− u¯j) , (A.7)
1
From (A.1) follows immediately that at least one of the two constraints has
to be binding, i.e., it is not possible that λLL = λPC = 0. Indeed, if both
λLL = λPC = 0, (A.1) implies that the profit of the principal could be
increased by reducing wij to its minimum level w = 0, a contradiction with
λLL = 0.
Furthermore, if (A.2) is binding, then (A.3) cannot be, unless mi = tij = 0.
The first-order condition with respect to m is always smaller or equal to zero,
(i.e., ∂L
∂mi
≤ 0) so that the principal wants to set m as low as possible. We
deduce that m∗i = m if extrinsic incentives for effort are needed and m
∗
i = 0
if no such incentives are needed.
We then get three cases:1
Case I: (LL) binding, (PC) not binding: If the (LL) constraint is binding
then λLL > 0 and wij = 0. If the (PC) is not binding then λPC = 0. By
Assumption 3, namely that ∆q2 ≥ 4aM(m), the principal always wants
to induce some effort from the worker. Extrinsic incentives are necessary
only if θij is small. To be more specific, from (A.2) it follows that mitij =
max{0, (∆q − θij)/2} is optimal.
The principal’s payoff then is
piIij = q +
{ 1
a
∆qθij if ∆q < θij
1
a
(
∆q+θij
2
)2
−M(m) if ∆q ≥ θij ,
and the agent’s payoff is
uij =
1
2a
{
θ2ij if ∆q < θij
(∆q + θij)
2/4 if ∆q ≥ θij .
In the limit, if the agent’s reservation utility is equal to this payoff, his
reservation utility becomes binding. This is true if u¯j = vij where
vij ≡
1
2a
(
max{0, (∆q − θij)/2}+ θij
)2
.
This means that Case I is only relevant when the agent’s reservation utility
is u¯j ∈ [0, vij ].
Case II: (LL) binding, (PC) binding: If the (LL) constraint is binding
(λLL > 0), then wij = 0. If the (PC) is also binding (λPC > 0), then from
(A.5) follows that mitij =
√
2au¯j−θij is optimal. For this to be a solution, it
1For clarity, we use case indices I to III in the following.
2
is necessary that mitij ≥ 0 which is equivalent to u¯j ≥ θ2ij/(2a). The agent’s
payoff is by construction uij = u¯j. The principal’s payoff is
piIIij = q +
1
a
(
∆q + θij −
√
2au¯j
)√
2au¯j −M(m) .
It is easy to check that piIij = pi
II
ij if u¯j = vij .
Case III: (LL) not binding, (PC) binding: If the (LL) constraint is
not binding (λLL = 0), then wij > 0. This implies in (A.1) an interior
solution so that λPC = 1. We deduce that if mi = m > 0, by (A.2), we get
mitij = ∆q. Plugging that into the participation constraint which is binding
we get wij = u¯j − (∆q + θij)2/(2a).
Note that for this it has to hold that u¯j− (∆q+θij)2/(2a) > 0. That is, Case
III is only relevant for agents with a reservation utility above
v˜ij ≡ 1
2a
(∆q + θij)
2 .
The principal’s payoff then is
piIIIij = q −
[
u¯j − 1
2a
(∆q + θij)
2
]
−M(m) ,
which, under the assumption that ∆q2 ≥ 4aM(m), is higher than the profit
achieved without monitoring (i.e., without extrinsic incentives piij = q− [u¯j−
1
2a
(θij)
2]). The agent’s payoff is by construction uij = u¯j.
The principal’s payoff from Case III becomes negative if the agent’s outside
utility exceeds
v¯ij ≡ 1
2a
(∆q + θij)
2 + q −M(m) .
Finally comparing piIIij with pi
III
ij it is easy to check that pi
II
ij = pi
III
ij iff u¯j = v˜ij.
The principal prefers Case III over Case II whenever the agent’s outside utility
exceeds v˜ij .
That is, Case III is relevant when the agent’s reservation utility is u¯j ∈
[v˜ij , v¯ij ], Case II is relevant when the agent’s reservation utility is u¯j ∈
[vij , v˜ij], and Case I is relevant when the agent’s reservation utility is u¯j ∈
[0, vij].
To finish the proof, we have to make sure that the principal’s payoff from
each scenario is positive. For this, q −M(m) > 0 is a sufficient assumption.
It also ensures that vij ≤ v˜ij ≤ v¯ij . QED
3
A.2 Implications of Proposition 1 for the For-Profit
Sector
Since θFj = 0 we can deduce the following corollary from Proposition 1 for
the for-profit sector:
Corollary A.1 : Depending on the size of the agent’s reservation utility,
the optimal contract in F takes the following form:
• Case I: For u¯ ∈ [0, vF ], w∗F = 0, m∗F = m, t∗F = ∆q/(2m);
• Case II: For u¯ ∈ (vF , v˜F ), w∗F = 0, m∗F = m, t∗F =
√
2au¯/m;
• Case III: For u¯ ∈ [v˜F , v¯F ], w∗F = u¯−∆q2/(2a), m∗F = m, t∗F = ∆q/m,
where vF = ∆q
2/(8a), v˜F = ∆q
2/(2a), and v¯F = ∆q
2/(2a) + q −M(m).
As a consequence, the utility of a worker, no matter whether good or regular,
in sector F in Case I is uF = ∆q
2/(8a). In Cases II and III it is equal to
u¯.2
The principal’s payoff is
piF = q −M(m) +


∆q2/(4a) in Case I
(∆q −√2au¯)√2au¯/a in Case II
∆q2/(2a)− u¯ in Case III
.
A.3 Implications of Proposition 1 for the Non-Profit
Sector
Let us define θNg := θg. For θg ≥ 0 we get the following corollary from
Proposition 1 for the non-profit sector:
Corollary A.2 : Depending on the size of the agent’s reservation utility,
the optimal contract in sector N is characterized as follows:
• Case I: If u¯ ∈ [0, vN ], we get two subcases:
(a) If θg < ∆q, then w
∗
N = 0, m
∗
N = m, and t
∗
N = (∆q − θg)/(2m).
(b) If θg ≥ ∆q, then w∗N = 0, m∗N = 0, and t∗N = 0.
2By Assumption 3, v˜F = ∆q
2/(2a) < v¯F = ∆q
2/(2a) + q −M(m).
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• Case II: If u¯ ∈ (vN , v˜N), then w∗N = 0, t∗N = 1m(
√
2au¯ − θg) and
m∗N = m.
• Case III: If u¯ ∈ [v˜N , v¯N ], then w∗N = u¯− (∆q + θg)2/(2a), m∗N = m,
and t∗N = ∆q/m.
Furthermore note that vN = (max{0, (∆q − θg)/2}+ θg)2/(2a), v˜N = (∆q +
θg)
2/(2a), and v¯N = (∆q + θg)
2 + q −M(m)/(2a).
The utility of a motivated agent in Cases II and III corresponds to his
reservation utility u¯, whereas in Case I he gets
uNg =
1
2a
{
θ2g if ∆q < θg
(∆q + θg)
2/4 if ∆q ≥ θg ,
which is higher or equal to what he would get in sector F . Regular agents,
on the other hand, do not derive any intrinsic satisfaction from working in
the mission-oriented sector, but only care about monetary incentives. Since
w∗N +m
∗
N t
∗
N ≤ w∗F +m∗F t∗F for any level of u¯, the utility of a regular worker
in N is always lower than in F .
The principal’s profit in sector N hence is
piN = q −M(m) + 1
a


(∆q + θg)
2/4 if θg ≤ ∆q
∆qθg + aM(m) if θg > ∆q
in Case I
(∆q + θg −
√
2au¯)
√
2au¯ in Case II
(∆q + θg)
2/2− au¯ in Case III
A.4 Robustness of Results to a Different Effort Cost
Function of Bad Workers
In our paper, we made the assumption that the effort costs of bad workers
take the form c(e, d) = a(e+d)2/2. As a result, bad workers choose to provide
either a positive effort e or a destructive effort d.
Alternatively, we could also consider a cost function of the form c(e, d) =
a(e2 + d2)/2 such that a bad worker with a level of negative motivation θb
would choose his optimal effort as e∗ = miti/a and d
∗ = (θb −miK)/a, i.e.,
he might provide both a constructive and a destructive effort at the same
time.
The gist of our results still applies for this cost function. To keep the com-
parison short, let us look at the case where u¯ = 0. Without bad workers,
5
the optimal contracts are as described in Case I in the two previous sections.
Given these contracts, and given the optimal effort choice of bad workers,
their expected utility in sector i = F,N hence corresponds to
uFb =
∆q2
8a
+
(θb −mK)2
2a
uNb =
{
(∆q−θg)2
8a
+
(θb−mK)
2
2a
if θg < ∆q
θ2b/(2a) if θg ≥ ∆q
.
From this we can deduct the level of automatic deterrence in each sector
(i.e., without any change in contract): In Sector F , d∗ = 0 if θb ≤ mK. If
θg < ∆q, there are no bad workers in N since their payoff from good behavior
is higher in F and their payoff from bad behavior is the same. If θg ≥ ∆q,
then bad workers with θb ≤ ∆q2/(8mK) +mK/2 prefer sector F , whereas
if they have a higher negative motivation, they prefer sector N where they
provide only a destructive effort.
Full Deterrence:
To achieve full deterrence of bad behavior, the principal in the for-profit
sector F maximizes the following objective function:3
max
wF ,tF ,mF
piF = q + (∆q −mF tF )mF tF
a
− wF −M(mF ) ,
subject to the limited liability and participation constraints as given in (3)
and (4), plus the deterrence constraint
(DET ) θb ≤ mFK .
From this we can see immediately, that in contrast to the model outlined in
the paper, we now can use only the monitoring level to prevent destructive
behavior. The bonus payment tF has no impact on deterrence. Hence m
det
F =
θb/K and t
det
F = m
∗
F t
∗
F/m
det
F . That is, while monitoring goes up, the overall
incentives for good behavior can stay the same.
In the nonprofit sector N , the principal has to set mdetN such that u
det
Nb ≤ udetF b .
Like in the for-profit sector, the extrinsic incentives for good behavior can stay
the same, i.e. tdetN = m
∗
N t
∗
N/m
det
N . Since the expected bonus for good behavior
in N is already lower than in F , full deterrence in N can be achieved with
a slightly lower monitoring level. More specifically, for u¯ = 0 and θg < ∆q,
3The objective function is the same as in the main part of the paper, only the deterrence
constraint (DET) is different. In the paper, it is mF tF ≥ θb −mFK.
6
udetNb ≤ udetNb if mdetN = mdetF −
√
(θb −mdetF K)2 + θg(2∆q − θg)/4/K. For u¯ = 0
and θg ≥ ∆q, udetNb ≤ udetNb if mdetN = mdetF −
√
(θb −mdetF K)2 + 4∆q/K.
Partial Deterrence:
The objective function of the principal under partial deterrence stays very
similar to the one in the paper. With the new cost function, the principal in
the for-profit sector now maximizes4
max
wF ,tF ,mF
piF = q + (∆q −mF tF )mF tF
a
− wF −M(mF )− βFDθb −mFK
a
,
and the principal in sector N maximizes5
max
wN ,tN ,mN
piN = q + (∆q −mN tN) 1a(mN tN + (1− βN )θg)− wN
−M(mN )− βND 1a(θb −mNK) .
Since bad workers react like regular workers to the bonus payment, there
is no distinction between the two in sector F concerning the provision of
positive effort, whereas in sector N , bad workers provide a lower positive
effort than good workers due to the lower extrinsic incentives. The level of
negative effort of bad workers in both sectors depends only on the prevailing
monitoring level, as before.
The maximization problem in F is essentially the same as before, in par-
ticular the optimal monitoring level with partial deterrence mpartF is such
that M ′(mpartF ) = βFDK/a.
6 The same is true for sector N . Also, N
can even achieve full deterrence of bad behavior by setting a monitoring
level slightly lower than in F . To do so, N has to choose mN such that
uNb(m
part
N ) ≤ uFb(mpartF ). For u¯ = 0 this corresponds to a monitoring level
mpartN =
θb
K
− 1
K


√
(θb −mpartF K)2 + θg(2∆q − θg)/4 if θg < ∆q√
(θb −mpartF K)2 + 4∆q2 if θg ≥ ∆q
.
Finally, the result that destructive behavior may be tolerated along the equi-
librium path still holds. To see this, consider the case where u¯ = 0 and
θg > ∆q. If the nonprofit sector does not change its benchmark contracts
4For comparison: in the paper, the profit function in F is piF = q + (1 − βF )(∆q −
mF tF )
mF tF
a
− wF −M(mF )− βFD θb−mFKa .
5For comparison: in the paper, the profit function in N is piN = q + (1 − βN )(∆q −
mN tN )
mN tN+θg
a
− wN −M(mN)− βND θb−mNKa .
6See proof of Proposition C.3 in Part C of the Appendix for details.
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(w∗N = m
∗
N = t
∗
N = 0), i.e., if the existence of bad workers is just ignored,
then the profit is
pi∗N = q +∆q
1
a
(1− βN)θg − βND1
a
θb .
If N changes its contracts such that there is full deterrence (wN = 0, mN =
mpartN , tN = 0), then its profit is given by
pipartN = q +∆q
1
a
θg −M(mpartN ) .
The former option is more attractive if the cost of additional monitoring is
higher than the damage done by bad workers, i.e., if
M(mpartN ) >
βN
a
(∆qθg +Dθb) ,
or if (aM(mpartN )/βN −Dθb)/∆q > θg > ∆q. That is, it may be cheaper for
the nonprofit sector to accept occasional destructive behavior if the expected
damage is sufficiently low.
A.5 Calculating Automatic Deterrence in N
In order to calculate the level of automatic deterrence in N , θ˜bN , we have to
insert the relevant contracts both in sectorN and F into (8).This is equivalent
to comparing the utility of a bad worker from effort e in F with his utility
from effort d in N .
Let us first consider the case where θg ≥ ∆q. Depending on the level of
reservation utility of the agents, Figure A.2 indicates which of the cases
derived in Corollaries A.1 and A.2 is relevant in each sector and summarizes
the resulting utility levels uNb(d) and uFb(e) that can be achieved by bad
workers. We then have to compare each possible combination of utility levels
in order to determine the relevant level of automatic deterrence. For instance,
Case Ib in sector N overlaps with Cases I, II and III in sector F . If we insert
the relevant values for mN , tN , wN as well as mF , tF , wF into (8), we find that
θ˜bN = ∆q/2 if u¯ < vF and θ˜bN =
√
2au¯ if vF < u¯ < vN .
Similar comparisons have to be made for the remainder of cases, as well as
for a setting where θg < ∆q, which is illustrated in Figure A.1.
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Case IuFb(e) =
∆q2
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2
2a
Case IIuFb(e) = u¯
uFb(d) =
(θb−mK)
2
2a
Case IIIuFb(e) = u¯
uFb(d) = u¯− ∆q22a + (θb−mK)
2
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vN
v˜N
v¯N
Case Ia uNb(d) =
(θb−mK)
2
2a
Case II uNb(d) =
(θb−mK)
2
2a
Case III uNb(d) = u¯− (∆q+θg)
2
2a
+
(θb−mK)
2
2a
Figure A.1: Bad workers’ utility from constructive and destructive effort in
F and destructive effort in N for θg < ∆q.
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+
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Figure A.2: Bad workers’ utility from constructive and destructive effort in
F and destructive effort in N for θg ≥ ∆q.
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B Full Deterrence Contracts
B.1 Full Deterrence in F
Proposition B.1 : For a given θb > θ˜bF and u¯ ∈ [0, v¯detF ], the optimal
contract with full deterrence (mdetF , t
det
F , w
det
F ) in sector F has the following
features:
(a) The optimal fixed wage is wdetF = max{0, u¯− 12a(θb −mdetF K)2},
(b) The optimal bonus payment is tdetF = θb/m
det
F −K.
(c) The optimal monitoring level is mdetF = min{max{m, m˜detF }, 1}, where
m˜detF is such that the following conditions hold:
2m˜detF K +M
′(m˜detF )a/K = 2θb −∆q if u¯ ∈ [0, vdetF ] ,
m˜detF =
1
K
(θb −
√
2au¯) if u¯ ∈ (vdetF , v˜detF ) ,
m˜detF K +M
′(m˜detF )a/K = θb −∆q if u¯ ∈ [v˜detF , v¯detF ] .
Proof. To solve the principal’s maximization problem with full deterrence
of bad workers we can formulate the following Lagrangian:
max
wF ,mF ,λLL,λPC
L(wF , mF , λLL, λPC)
= q + (∆q − θb +mFK) · θb −mFK
a
− wF −M(mF )
+ λLLwF + λPC
(
wF +
(θb −mFK)2
2a
− u¯j
)
,
The corresponding first-order conditions are
∂L
∂wF
= −1 + λLL + λPC = 0 , (B.8)
∂L
∂mF
=
K
a
[2θb − 2mFK −∆q]−M ′(mF )− λPCK
a
(θb −mFK) .(B.9)
Furthermore it has to hold that
0 = λLLwF (B.10)
0 = λPC(wF + (θb −mFK)2/(2a)− u¯j) . (B.11)
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As before, we get three cases:7
Case I: (LL) binding, (PC) not binding: From condition (B.10) and
λLL > 0 follows that the optimal basic wage in Case I w
I
F = 0. From
condition (B.9) and λPC = 0 it follows that the optimal monitoring level m˜
I
F
has to be such that
2θb −∆q = a
K
M ′(m˜IF ) + 2m˜
I
FK .
Case II: (LL) and (PC) binding: If both conditions are binding, then
λLL > 0 and λPC > 0. Again, by condition (B.10) we therefore have that the
optimal wage in Case II wIIF = 0. Furthermore, condition (B.11) is fulfilled
iff
m˜IIF =
θb −
√
2au¯
K
.
Case III: (LL) not binding, (PC) binding: Since λLL = 0, by (B.8) we
get λPC = 1. Inserting this in (B.9), we get that the monitoring level in Case
III m˜IIIF has to be such that the following holds:
θb −∆q = a
K
M ′(m˜IIIF ) + m˜
III
F K .
Furthermore, since λPC = 1, the corresponding optimal basic wage is w
III
F =
u¯− (θb − m˜IIIF K)2/(2a).
Note that depending on the functional form ofM(m), the optimal monitoring
levels calculated above may not be contained in [m, 1]. Since this is excluded
by assumption, the optimal monitoring level is mdetF = min{max{m, m˜F}, 1},
where m˜F is such that the following conditions are fulfilled:
2m˜FK +M
′(m˜F )a/K = 2θb −∆q in Case I ,
m˜F = (θb −
√
2au¯)/K in Case II ,
m˜FK +M
′(m˜F )a/K = θb −∆q in Case III .
The appropriate monitoring level has to be plugged into every expression
containing m. Therefore the basic wage in Case III has to be rewritten as
wIIIF = u¯− (θb −mdetIIIF K)2/(2a), where mdetIIIF = min{max{m, m˜IIIF }, 1}.
We now can determine the transfer payment that rewards positive effort:
Since the deterrence constraint mF tF = θb − mFK is binding, the optimal
7For the sake of shortness, the index “det” is omitted unless needed for clarity. Instead,
a case index is added.
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transfer level tdetF is always calculated as t
det
F = θb/m
det
F −K, where again the
appropriate value of mdetF has to be plugged in.
To determine when each of the Cases I to III is relevant, we have to calculate
the critical values vdetF , v˜
det
F , and v¯
det
F of the agent’s outside utility delimiting
the above three cases.
Case I holds until the (PC) becomes binding. That is, it holds if the level of
outside utility is u¯ ∈ [0, vdetF ], where vdetF is defined as
vdetF ≡ (θb −mdetIF K)2/(2a) ,
and mdetIF = min{max{m, m˜IF}, 1} as defined above. Recall that vF =
(m∗F t
∗
F )
2/(2a) and that (θb − mdetIF K) > m∗F t∗F since θb > θ˜bF . Therefore
vdetF > vF .
Next, let us consider v˜detF , which defines the border between Cases II and
III. Case III is only relevant if u¯j − (θb −mIIIF K)2/(2a) > 0, where mIIIF =
min{max{m,mIIIF }, 1}. That is, Case III is only relevant for agents with a
reservation utility above
v˜detF ≡
1
2a
(θb −mIIIF K)2 .
Note that the limited liability constraint is trivially fulfilled if u¯ > v˜detF . Again,
since we consider only cases where θb > θ˜bF and hence (θb−mIIIF K) > m∗F t∗F ,
we get that v˜detF > v˜F .
Finally, v¯detF is defined as the outside utility of the agent for which the prin-
cipal’s profit becomes zero. This may happen in either of the three cases,
depending on the relative size of θb. In Case III, pi
III
F = 0 if:
v¯detF ≡ q +
1
2a
(θb −mIIIF K)2 −M(mIIIF )
+ (∆q − θb +mIIIF K)(θb −mIIIF K)
1
a
,
where mIIIF = min{max{m, m˜IIIF }, 1} and m˜IIIF is such that θb − ∆q =
a/KM ′(mF ) +mFK as derived above.
In Cases I and II, profits become zero or negative if
q + (∆q − θb +mdetF K)(θb −mdetF K)/a−M(mdetF ) ≥ 0 . (B.12)
If this last condition holds, then also v¯detF < v˜
det
F such that Case III is no
longer relevant. Instead, profits become zero for any outside utility below
v˜detF if θb is sufficiently high to fulfill condition (B.12).
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The derivative of v¯detF with respect to θb is smaller than zero if (∆q − θb +
mIIIF K)M
′′(mIIIF ) ≤ aM ′(mIIIF ). Since M ′(m) > 0 and M ′′(m) > 0 and since
we consider only cases where θb > θ˜bF it holds that (θb −mIIIF K) > m∗F t∗F =
∆q. Hence the expression in brackets is negative and the above inequality is
fulfilled. We therefore know that v¯detF is decreasing in θb.
How high is v¯detF relative to v¯F ? Recall that v¯F = q +
1
2a
∆q2 −M(m). Hence
v¯detF < v¯F if
1
2a
[(θb −mIIIF K)2 −∆q2]−M(mIIIF ) +M(m)
+(∆q − θb +mIIIF K)(θb −mIIIF K)
1
a
< 0 .
This is equivalent to:
−
(
θb −mIIIF K −∆q
)2
− 2a
(
M(mIIIF )−M(m)
)
< 0 .
Since mIIIF ≥ m and M(·) is an increasing function of m, the left-hand side
of this inequality is negative, and we hence have shown that v¯detF < v¯F .QED
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3: Comparison with Bench-
mark Contracts
How does the monitoring level and the expected bonus under full deterrence
change compared to the benchmark contracts?
Lemma B.1 As θb increases, the principal first keeps monitoring at its min-
imal level and rather increases the bonus payment, before he also starts to
monitor more. The only exception is Case II in Proposition B.1, where
mdetF > m for any θb > θ˜bF .
Proof. Consider the value of θb for which m˜
det
F > m in each case of Propo-
sition B.1, i.e., m˜detF > m if
θb >


∆q/2 +mK +M ′(m˜IF )a/K in Case I ,
mK +
√
2au¯ in Case II ,
∆q +mK +M ′(m˜IIIF )a/K in Case III .
Comparing this to the definition of θ˜bF in each case as given in (7),we can
easily see that the critical level of θb for which F starts to increase his mon-
itoring level beyond m is above θ˜bF , except in Case II, where F starts to
increase monitoring right away as soon as θb > θ˜bF . QED.
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Lemma B.2 For θb > θ˜bF and any u¯ ≥ 0, the expected bonus under full
deterrence is mdetF t
det
F ≥ m∗F t∗F .
Proof Suppose mdetF = m
∗
F = m. Then from (7)and Proposition B.1 follows
that tdetF > t
∗
F and therefore, m
det
F t
det
F > m
∗
F t
∗
F .
Suppose mdetF > m. If we solve the conditions for m˜
det
F given in Proposition
B.1 for m˜detF K and plug them into the deterrence constraint, we get
mdetF t
det
F = θb −mdetF K =


∆q/2 +M ′(mdetF )a/K in Case I ,√
2au¯ in Case II ,
∆q +M ′(mdetF )a/K in Case III .
(B.13)
Recall that
m∗F t
∗
F =


∆q/2 in Case I ,√
2au¯ in Case II ,
∆q in Case III .
(B.14)
Comparing (B.13) and (B.14), we can see right away that mdetF t
det
F > m
∗
F t
∗
F
in Cases I and III since M ′(mdetF )a/K > 0. If Case II applies both with full
deterrence and in the benchmark scenario, then mdetF t
det
F = m
∗
F t
∗
F . Hence,
overall mdetF t
det
F ≥ m∗F t∗F . QED
An illustrative example for these results can be found in Section D of the
Appendix.
B.3 Full Deterrence in N
Proposition B.2 : If θb > θ˜bN then, for a given contract (mF , tF , wF ) in
sector F and a reservation payoff u¯ ∈ [0, v¯detN ], the principal in sector N can
achieve full deterrence of bad workers by offering a contract (mdetN , t
det
N , w
det
N )
with the following features:
(a) The fixed wage is wdetN = w
∗
N with w
∗
N as defined in Proposition 1.
(b) The monitoring level is mdetN = min{max{m, m˜detN }, 1}, with
m˜detN =
(
θb −
√
2a(umax − w∗N)
)
/K ,
where umax := max{uF (e), uF (d), u¯}.
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(c) The bonus payment is
tdetN =
{
tF − θg/mF , if u¯ < vF and mF tF > m∗N t∗N + θg
m∗N t
∗
N/m
det
N otherwise
,
with m∗N t
∗
N as defined in Proposition 1.
Proof. To achieve full deterrence, N has to make sure that uNb(d) ≤ umax :=
max{uF (e), uF (d), u¯}, that is, wdetN + (θb − mdetN K)2/(2a) ≤ umax. For any
given outside utility u¯, the basic wage in N is smaller or equal than the basic
wage in F . This acts as a deterring element to bad, but not to good workers.
Taking this into account, there is no reason to change wN compared to the
benchmark contracts, i.e., wdetN = w
∗
N . The above condition therefore can
be rewritten as mdetN ≥ (θb −
√
2a(umax − w∗N)/K, which gives us a general
formula for the optimal level of monitoring. More precisely, the optimal
monitoring level will be given by
mdetN =


mF if u¯ < v˜F
θb/K −
√
2a(wF − wN∗) + (θb −mFK)2/K if v˜F ≤ u¯ < v¯F
θb/K −
√
2a(u¯− wN∗)/K if u¯ ≥ v¯F
That is, N will set the same monitoring level as in F when the basic wage is
the same in both sectors or a just slightly lower level when the basic wage in
F is higher than in N . When F is no longer active, N has to set monitoring
such that bad workers prefer not to work.
Since F may increase incentives for good behavior above their optimal level
as part of its deterrence strategy, we have to check whether good workers
in that case will still prefer to work in N . For u¯ ≥ vF , it is easy to show
that uNg(e) ≥ uF (e) = u¯ and hence mdetN tdetN = m∗N t∗N is a sufficient incentive.
That is, as m∗N increases, t
∗
N goes down such that the overall incentives for
good workers stay the same.
However, for u¯ < vF , uF (e) may be greater than in the benchmark case
and hence mdetN t
det
N = m
det
F t
det
F − θg has to hold. Since in this range of values
mdetN = m
det
F , the optimal bonus in N is t
det
N = t
det
F − θg/mdetF . Yet, this case is
only relevant if θg is small enough, i.e., if θg < m
det
F t
det
F −m∗N t∗N . If the level
of intrinsic motivation is higher, then good workers will prefer N even with
the benchmark contracts.
B.4 Equilibrium with Full Deterrence
To determine the equilibrium outcome, we have to check where the bad guys
are, given the benchmark contracts. We do this by comparing the utility
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they can achieve from choosing (F, e), (F, d), or (N, d).8
For a low level of positive intrinsic motivation (θg < ∆q), we can distinguish
the following cases, depending on the level of outside utility:
(i) u¯ < v˜F : For low levels of negative intrinsic motivation, there is automatic
deterrence in both sectors. However, for θb > θ˜bN = θ˜bF , uNb(d) = uFb(d) >
uFb(e) > u¯. With the benchmark contracts, bad workers are thus indifferent
between N and F , but will behave badly in any case. To deter such behavior,
F will have to adopt the contracts described in Proposition B.1. Given F ’s
choice of contract, N can deter bad workers by raising mN as described in
Proposition B.2. In equilibrium, all bad workers are in F and behave like
regular types.
(ii) v˜F < u¯ < v¯F : In this range of values, the level of automatic deterrence in
N is higher than in F . For θb ≤ θ˜bF , there is automatic deterrence in both
sectors, meaning that bad workers will prefer F , but will be indistinguishable
from regular workers. For θ˜bF < θb ≤ θ˜bN , their utility from choosing (F, d)
will be higher than from (F, e) or (N, d) under the benchmark contracts,
meaning that F will have to switch to the full deterrence contract outlined
in Proposition B.1, whereas N only has to adjust its contracts if θb > θ˜bN .
(iii) v¯F < u¯: For θb ≤ θ˜bN , uNb(d) ≤ u¯ holds and bad workers hence prefer
to enjoy their outside utility rather than work in N . If θb > θ˜bN , then N will
have to raise mN as described in Proposition B.2 to achieve the same effect.
For a high level of positive intrinsic motivation (θg ≥ ∆q), we can distinguish
the following cases:9
(i) u¯ < vN : For very low levels of negative intrinsic motivation (θb ≤ θ˜bN ),
there is automatic deterrence in both sector N and F . However, as θb goes
up, the complete lack of monitoring in sector N will make working in N the
most attractive option of bad workers. To get rid of the bad guys, it is suffi-
cient for N to introduce monitoring and set it to the same level as in sector
F . This latter sector can count on automatic deterrence of bad workers up to
θb ≤ θ˜bF . If the negative motivation of bad workers is higher than that, F can
achieve full deterrence by introducing the contracts described in Proposition
B.1. In an equilibrium with full deterrence in both sectors, bad workers will
always work in F and behave like regular workers.
(ii)vN < u¯ < v¯F : Due to the lower basic wage, automatic deterrence is higher
in N than in F . As a consequence, for θb ≤ θ˜bF bad workers choose (F, e)
whereas for θ˜bF < θb ≤ θ˜bN , they prefer (F, d). To achieve full deterrence,
F will have to introduce the contract described in Proposition B.1 for any
θb > θ˜bF . N can keep its benchmark contract as long as θb ≤ θ˜bN , but will
8See Figures A.1 and A.2. By virtue of Proposition 2 these are the only relevant options.
9See Figure A.2 for an overview of the utility of bad workers in both sectors.
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have to raise mN for higher levels of θb such that ubN(d) ≤ u¯, i.e., by setting
mN = m
det
N as defined in Proposition B.2. In equilibrium, all the bad guys
will behave regularly in sector F .
(iii) v¯F < u¯: For a very high reservation utility, sector N is the only possible
employment option for bad workers. If θb < θ˜bN bad workers are automat-
ically deterred, otherwise N can achieve full deterrence by setting mN such
that ubN(d) ≤ u¯, i.e., by setting mN = mdetN as defined in Proposition B.2.
As a result, bad workers prefer not to work at all in equilibrium.
C Partial Deterrence Contracts
C.1 Optimal Contracts with Partial Deterrence
Proposition C.3 : For θb > θ˜bi, the optimal contract with partial deterrence
and strictly positive monitoring in sector i = N,F given a reservation payoff
u¯ ∈ [0, v¯parti ] has the following features:
(a) The optimal fixed wage is wparti = max
{
0, u¯− 1
2a
(
1−βi
1−2βi
(∆q + θig)
)2}
,
(b) The monitoring level is mparti = min{max{m, m˜parti }, 1}, where m˜parti is
such that M ′(m˜parti ) = βiDK/a.
(c) The optimal bonus payment is
tparti =


(∆q − θig)/(2mparti )} if u¯ ∈ [0, vparti ]
(
√
2au¯− θig)/mparti if u¯ ∈ (vparti , v˜parti )
(∆q − βi(∆q − θig))/((1− 2βi)mparti ) if u¯ ∈ [v˜parti , v¯parti ]
.
where
vparti = v
∗
i = (m
part
i t
part
i + θig)
2/(2a)
v˜parti =
1
2a
( 1− βi
1− 2βi (∆q + θig)
)2
v¯parti s.t. Π
part
i = 0.
Proof. To solve the principal’s maximization problem in sector i = {N,F}
with only partial deterrence, we can formulate the following Lagrangian:
max
wi,mi,ti,λLL,λPC
L(wi, mi, ti, λLL, λPC) = q − wi −M(mi)
+ (1− βi)(∆q −miti)(miti + θig)
a
− βiD(θb −miK)1
a
+ λLLwi + λPC(wi + (miti + θig)
2/(2a)− u¯j) ,
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and the corresponding first-order conditions are
∂L
∂wi
= −1 + λLL + λPC = 0 , (C.15)
∂L
∂ti
=
mi
a
[(1− βi)(∆q − 2miti − θig) + λPC(miti + θig)] = 0 ,(C.16)
∂L
∂mi
=
ti
a
[(1− βi)(∆q − 2miti − θig) + λPC(miti + θig)]
−M ′(mi) + βiDK
a
= 0 . (C.17)
Furthermore, the following has to be true:
0 = λLLwi , (C.18)
0 = λPC(wi + (miti + θig)
2/(2a)− u¯j) . (C.19)
Equation (C.16), i.e., the FOC with respect to ti, is fulfilled if the ex-
pression in square brackets is equal to zero. This implies that (C.17), the
FOC with respect to mi, simplifies to −M ′(mi) + βiDK/a = 0, and hence
the optimal level of monitoring without full deterrence of bad workers is
such that M ′(mparti ) = βiDK/a. However, we have to make sure that
mparti ∈ {0, [m, 1]}, i.e., that we get an interior solution. This problem is
the same for all possible parameter values discussed below and we there-
fore can write immediately that the optimal monitoring level with partial
deterrence is
mparti = min{max{m, m˜parti }, 1} , (C.20)
where m˜parti s.t. M
′(m˜parti ) = βiDK/a .
As before, we get three possible cases:
Case I: (LL) binding, but not (PC): In this case, λLL > 0, and therefore,
by (C.18), wparti = 0. Furthermore, λPC = 0, such that condition (C.16), i.e.,
the FOC with respect to ti is fulfilled ifm
part
i t
part
i = (∆q−θig)/2 = m∗i t∗i . The
optimal contract in Case I therefore is given by wparti = 0, m
part
i as defined
in (C.20), and tparti = m
∗
i t
∗
i /m
part
i = (∆q− θig)/(2mparti ). The resulting profit
in Case I is:
piparti = (1− βi)
(∆q + θig)
2
4a
− βiD
a
(θb −mparti K) + q −M(mparti ) .
Case I is valid as long as the participation constraint is not binding, which
is true for
u¯ < wparti + (m
∗
i t
∗
i + θig)
2/(2a) = 0 + (∆q + θig)
2/(2a) = vparti = v
∗
i .
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The boundary for Case I is thus the same as in the benchmark case without
bad workers.
Case II: (LL) and (PC) binding: Since λLL > 0, by (C.18), w
part
i = 0.
Furthermore, since λPC > 0, from (C.19) follows that miti =
√
2au¯ − θig
which is exactly the same condition as in Case II without bad workers. Hence
mparti t
part
i = m
∗
i t
∗
i also in Case II.
The same reasoning as outlined above then can be made. The optimal
contract in Case II is wparti = 0, m
part
i as defined in (C.20) and t
part
i =
m∗i t
∗
i /m
part
i = (
√
2au¯− θig)/mparti . The resulting profit in Case II is
piparti = (1− βi)(∆q −
√
2au¯+ θig)
√
2au¯
a
− βiD
a
(θb −mparti K) + q −M(mparti ) .
Case III: (PC) binding, but not (LL): Since λLL = 0, by (C.18), w
part
i >
0. Furthermore, λPC > 0 and hence w
part
i = u¯− (miti+θig)2/(2a) must hold.
By condition (C.15), λLL = 0 also implies that λPC = 1. Condition (C.16),
therefore is fulfilled if miti = [(1 − βi)∆q + βiθig]/(1 − 2βi) . Note that this
last expression is positive if βi < 0.5 and smaller or equal zero if βi ≥ 0.5.
The latter would, however, imply a destructive effort incentive for workers
which does not make much sense.
From this, we get as optimal contract in Case III wparti = u¯[(∆q + θig)(1 −
βi)/(1−2βi)]2, mparti as defined in (C.20) and tparti = [∆q−βi(∆q−θig)]/[(1−
2βi)m
part
i ]. The profit in Case III hence is given by
piparti = q − u¯+
[(1− βi)(∆q + θig)]2
(1− 2βi)2a −
βiD
a
(θb −mparti K)−M(mparti ) .
Furthermore, from the above results we can deduce the frontier between
Cases II and III: If we plug wparti into the limited liability constraint we find
that Case III is only valid for an outside utility u¯ > v˜parti where
v˜parti ≡
1
2a
( 1− βi
1− 2βi (∆q + θig)
)2
.
Recall that in the benchmark case without bad workers v˜i = (∆q+θig)
2/(2a).
Comparing these two values, we find that v˜parti > v˜i if βi < 0.5.
Finally, we have to determine v¯parti , i.e., when profits become negative. In
contrast to the benchmark model, this may happen in any of the three
subcases, provided that q is low and/ or θb is high enough. Let us define
19
Z := q − βiD
a
(θb − mparti K) − M(mparti ). Then, in Case I, profit becomes
negative if
Z ≤ 1− βi
a
(∆q + θig)
2
for all u¯ ∈ [0, vi]. If Z is larger, profits become negative for
u¯ ≥ min{v¯partIIi , v¯part
III
i } ,
where
v¯part
II
i ≡
1
4a
[
(∆q + θig)
2 +
2aZ
1− βi +
√
(∆q + θig)4 + 4(∆q + θig)2
aZ
1− βi
]
is the value of outside utility for which profits in Case II become negative,
and
v¯part
III
i ≡ Z +
1− 2βi
2a
( 1− βi
1− 2βi (∆q + θig)
)2
is the value of outside utility for which profits in Case III become negative.
The former is smaller than the latter if
Z ≤ βi
a
( 1− βi
1− 2βi (∆q + θig)
)2
.
That is, if the last inequality is fulfilled, i.e., if q is small and/ or θb high
enough, then Case III basically disappears, since profits in this case will be
negative.
C.2 Equilibrium with Partial Deterrence
Proposition C.4 : In an equilibrium with partial deterrence, the optimal
contracts in N and F can be described as follows:
(a) If [aM(mdetN )(1 + xg/xb) − Dθb]/∆q > θg > ∆q and u¯ ∈ [0, vN ], then
N sticks to the benchmark contracts, i.e., m∗N = t
∗
N = w
∗
N = 0. F
also keeps its benchmark contracts if furthermore one of the following
conditions holds:
(i) u¯ ∈ [0, v˜partF ], or
(ii) u¯ ∈ [v˜partF , vN ] and θ˜bF < θb ≤ [2au¯−∆q2 + (mFK)2]/(2mFK).
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Otherwise, the optimal contract in F is given by Proposition C.3.
(b) If either θg < ∆q or θg ≥ [aM(mpartF )(1 + xg/xb) − Dθb]/∆q, and u¯ ∈
[0, v¯partF ], the optimal contract in F is given by Proposition C.3. N
sets its monitoring level mpartN ≥ m such that uNb(d) ≤ uFb(d) while
keeping the incentives for positive effort as in the benchmark contracts:
mpartN t
part
N = m
∗
N t
∗
N and w
part
N = w
∗
N .
(c) If u¯ ∈ [v¯partF , v¯partN ], then only N is active and the optimal contract in N
is given by Proposition C.3.
Proof. If u¯ ∈ [v¯partF , v¯N ], then only sector N is active. To at least partially
deter bad workers, the principal in sector N hence has to adapt the contracts
according to Proposition C.3.
Next, let us consider all cases, where both sectors offer contracts and the
optimal monitoring in sector N in the benchmark case is m∗N = m, i.e.,
if θg < ∆q and u¯ ∈ [0, v¯partF ] or if θg ≥ ∆q and u¯ ∈ [vN , v¯partF ]. Given
the benchmark contracts and θb > θ˜bF , all bad workers derive the highest
possibility from sabotage in sector F such that βF = β¯F . F will therefore
have to adapt his contracts according to Proposition C.3. In that case, if
mpartF > m, all bad workers would switch to N such that βN = β¯N . Since
by Assumption ?? β¯N > β¯F , the resulting optimal monitoring level in N
according to Proposition C.3 would be equal or higher than in F . However,
N can achieve full deterrence of bad workers by adopting a monitoring level
mN ≤ mpartF such that uN(d) ≤ uF (d).
Now we are only left with the case where θg ≥ ∆q and u¯ ∈ [0, vN ]. The
benchmark contract in N implies zero monitoring and hence all bad guys
choose (N, d) for θb > θ˜bN . The principal in N then faces two options:
(a) Stick with the benchmark contracts, even if he thus attracts all bad guys,
which yields profit
ΠN (wN = 0, mN = tN = 0) = q + (1− β¯N)∆qθg/a− β¯NDθb/a .
(b) Introduce monitoring. If he chooses this option he can even achieve full
deterrence by setting mN = m
det
N , where m
det
N = m
part
F for u¯ ∈ [0, v˜partF ],
whereas for u¯ ∈ [v˜partF , vN ], mdetN such that uNb(d) ≤ uFb(d). That is, the
profit in N becomes
ΠN (wN = 0, mN = m
det
N , tN = 0) = q +∆qθg/a−M(mdetN ) .
If damageD is low enough, the former option may yield a higher profit. Then,
N will prefer to stick to its first best contracts even if it thus attracts all bad
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workers. That is, he prefers option (a) if [aM(mdetN )(1+ xg/xb)−Dθb]/∆q >
θg ≥ ∆q. This corresponds to case (a) in Proposition C.4.
Given these considerations for sector N , how should F react? Obviously,
if there is no monitoring in N , all bad workers will choose that sector and
hence F can keep its benchmark contracts. This is true if [aM(mdetN )(1 +
xg/xb) − Dθb]/∆q > θg and if either (i) u¯ ∈ [0, v˜partF ] or (ii) u¯ ∈ [v˜partF , vN ]
and θ˜bF < θb ≤ [2au¯ −∆q2 + (mFK)2]/(2mFK). If u¯ ∈ [v˜partF , vN ] and θb >
[2au¯−∆q2+ (mFK)2]/(2mFK) then the basic wage in F is sufficiently high
to attract all bad workers even if there is zero monitoring in N . Therefore,
F will have to adapt its contracts according to Proposition C.3.
If, on the other hand, option (b) yields a higher profit for N than option (a),
i.e., if [aM(mdetN )(1 + xg/xb)−Dθb]/∆q < θg, then N will want to introduce
monitoring. In equilibrium, F will then change its contracts according to
Proposition C.3 and N will set the monitoring level mN ≥ m such that
uNb(d) ≤ uFb(d). For u¯ ∈ [0, v˜partF ] this means setting mN = mpartF , for
u¯ ∈ [v˜partF , vN ] mN can be slightly lower than mpartF due to the higher basic
wage in F .
D Example
In the following, let us consider an example where the monitoring function is
M(m) = m2/2, which may give the interested reader a better intuition of the
results in Section 4. Note that the results of the benchmark case without bad
workers do not change substantially and therefore can be directly gathered
from Section 3.
Full Deterrence in the For-Profit Sector
As before, we can distinguish three cases:
Case I: For θb < θ˜
I
bF := ∆q/2 +mK, there is automatic deterrence of bad
workers. The optimal contract then corresponds to the contract outlined in
Corollary A.1, i.e., the basic wage is 0, monitoring is at its minimum level
m, and the bonus payment is given by ∆q/(2m).
If θb > θ˜
I
bF , we have to calculate the optimal level of monitoring according to
Proposition B.1 which gives us
m˜detF = (2θb −∆q)K/(a+ 2K2) .
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However, this term is smaller than m if θb < θ˜
I
b + am/(2K)) and larger than
1 if θb > ∆q/2+K+ a/(2K). Hence, for θb > θ˜
I
bF , the optimal contract with
full deterrence is given by
wdetF = 0 , t
det
F = θb/m
det
F −K ,
mdetF =


m if θb ∈ (θ˜IbF , θ˜IbF + am/(2K))
(2θb −∆q)K/(a+ 2K2) if θb ∈ [θ˜IbF + am/(2K),
∆q/2 +K + a/(2K)]
1 if θb > ∆q/2 +K + a/(2K)
.
That is, even when bad workers are not automatically deterred (i.e., when
θb > θ˜
I
bF ), the monitoring level stays low. It is cheaper to just increase the
bonus payment. However, as θb increases further, the principal in F also has
to increase monitoring, although this comes at a higher cost than just raising
the bonus. For very high levels of θb, we may get a corner solution such that
m hits its maximum level m = 1. In that case, the principal’s only option to
deter bad workers is to pay a higher bonus for good behavior.
Case II: In Case II, bad workers are automatically deterred from bad actions
if θb < θ˜
II
bF :=
√
2au¯ + mK, and the optimal contract remains unchanged
compared to the case without bad workers. That is, the basic wage is 0, the
monitoring level is m, and the bonus payment is given by
√
2au¯/m.
If θb > θ˜
II
bF , m˜
det
F = (θb −
√
2au¯)/K, which is smaller than m for θb < ˜theta
II
b
and larger than 1 if θb > K+
√
2au¯. Therefore the optimal contract with full
deterrence is given by
wdetF = 0 , t
det
F = θb/m
det
F −K ,
mdetF =


m if θb < θ˜
II
bF
(θb −
√
2au¯)/K if θb ∈ [θ˜IIbF , K +
√
2au¯]
1 if θb > K +
√
2au¯
.
Case III: Finally, in Case III, bad workers are automatically deterred from
bad actions if θb ≤ θ˜IIIbF := ∆q + mK. That is, the optimal contract is
as if there were no bad workers with a basic wage equal to u¯ − ∆q2/(2a),
monitoring at its minimal level m, and the bonus payment equal to ∆q/m.
If θb > θ˜
III
bF , then according to Proposition B.1, monitoring is calculated as
m˜detF = (θb −∆q)K/(a+ 2K2) .
However, this value is smaller than m if θb < θ˜
I
bF + am/K) and larger than
one if θb > ∆q + K + a/K. Therefore, for θb > θ˜
III
bF , the optimal contract
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with full deterrence is given by
wdetF = u¯− (θb −mdetF K)2/(2a) , tdetF = θb/mdetF −K ,
mdetF =


m if θb ∈ (θ˜IIIbF , θ˜IbF + am/K)
(θb −∆q)K/(a+ 2K2) if θb ∈ [θ˜IIIbF + am/K,
∆q +K + a/K]
1 if θb > ∆q +K + a/K
.
That is, as in Case I, the optimal monitoring level is constrained by the corner
solutions m and 1. In both of these cases, the principal has to increase
the bonus payment for good behavior in order to achieve full deterrence.
However, for intermediate values of θb it is better to increase the monitoring
level rather than the bonus payment, even though monitoring is costly.
Which case is relevant when? Case I is valid if the agents’ outside utility
u¯ < vF , where
vF =
1
2a
·


∆q2/4 if θb ≤ θ˜IbF
(θb −mK)2 if θb ∈ (θ˜IbF , θ˜IbF + am/(2K))
((aθb +∆qK
2)/(a+ 2K2))2 if θb ∈ [θ˜IbF + am/(2K),
K + a/(2K) + ∆q/2]
(θb −K)2 if θb ≥ K + a/(2K) + ∆q/2
where θ˜IIIbF := ∆q/2 +mK.
Case II is valid if the agents’ outside utility u¯ ∈ (vF , v˜F ), where vF is defined
above and
v˜F =
1
2a
·


∆q2 if θb ≤ θ˜IIbF
(θb −mK)2 if θb ∈ (θ˜IIbF , θ˜IIIbF + am/K)
(aθb +∆qK
2)2/(a+K2)2 if θb ∈ (θ˜IIIb + am/K),
K + a/K +∆q)
(θb −K)2 if θb ≥ K + a/K +∆q
where θ˜IIIbF := ∆q +mK.
Case III is valid if the agents’ outside utility u¯ > v˜F , where v˜F is defined
above.
Note that, depending on the exact parameter values, the profit of organiza-
tion F may become zero in any of the three cases.
Figure D.3 illustrates the above considerations and shows, which case is rel-
evant for which combinations of outside utility u¯ and negative intrinsic mo-
tivation θb.
10
10The graph is based on the following parameter values: q = 2,∆q = 2, a = 10,m =
0.1,K = 3. The monitoring function takes the form M(m) = m2/2.
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∆q2
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θ˜Ib
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θ˜IIIb θ˜
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v˜F
Case I
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Case III
Figure D.3: Relevant cases in F depending on outside utility u¯ and negative
intrinsic motivation θb.
Furthermore, Figure 6shows for a given outside utility how the monitoring
level and profits develop as θb increases. Figure 4shows how the expected
bonus develops.
Full Deterrence in the Non-Profit Sector
According to Proposition B.2, N can achieve full deterrence by setting m˜detN
such that uNb(d) ≤ max{uFb(e), uFb(d), u¯}.
Depending on which is the relevant comparison, m˜detN takes the following
form:
• If max{uFb(e), uFb(d), u¯} = uFb(e):
uNb(d) ≤ uFb(e)
wN + (θb −mNK)2/(2a) ≤ wF + (mF tF )2/(2a)
⇒ m˜detN = (θb −
√
2a(wF − wN) + (mF tF )2)/K
• If max{uFb(e), uFb(d), u¯} = uFb(d):
uNb(d) ≤ uFb(d)
wN + (θb −mNK)2/(2a) ≤ wF + (θb −mFK)2/(2a)
⇒ m˜detN = (θb −
√
2a(wF − wN) + (θb −mFK)2)/K
• If max{uFb(e), uFb(d), u¯} = u¯:
uNb(d) ≤ u¯
wN + (θb −mNK)2/(2a) ≤ u¯
⇒ m˜detN = (θb −
√
2a(u¯− wN))/K
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Suppose that F does not adapt its initial contracts to the presence of bad
workers, but sticks to (w∗F , m
∗
F , t
∗
F ). Then depending on the level of negative
motivation θb and outside utility u¯, the following inequalities hold:
(a) For θb ≤ θ˜bF and u¯ < v¯F : uFb(e) ≥ u¯ ≥ uFb(d).
(b) For θb > θ˜bF and u¯ < v¯F : uFb(d) > uFb(e) ≥ u¯.
(c) For u¯ > v¯F : only u¯ relevant, since F is no longer active.
That is, full deterrence can be achieved if mdetN = min{max{m, m˜detN }, 1}
where m˜detN is given by
m˜detN =
θb
K
− 1
K
·


√
2a(wF − wN) + (mF tF )2 in (a)√
2a(wF − wN) + (θb −mFK)2 in (b)√
2a(u¯− wN) in (c)
,
where the relevant values for (wF , mF , tF ) as well as for wN , θb and u¯ have
to be plugged in.
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